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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE DUAL USE DILEMMA: CRYING OUT FOR LEADERSHIP
DAVID R. FRANZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Between October 2011 and March 2012, a controversy regarding the
publication of results of H5N1 influenza virus research by two scientists led
to additional oversight of a relatively broad segment of the infectious
disease research enterprise in the U.S.1 The episode has been described as
an example of the “dual use dilemma,” legitimate and open research that
could be exploited for harm by others. Why is leadership important in the
context of the dual use dilemma? Is not dual use about technology and
knowledge being misused for harm? Can we not just control the knowledge
and technologies? How is the dual use dilemma related to the insider threat
in research and clinical laboratories? What is our interest in these low
likelihood events in twenty-first century America? The recent concern
regarding Dual Use Research (DUR) is focused on the traditional agents of
biological warfare and the influenza viruses. Yet, these Select Agents are but
a small part of the spectrum of biological threats and risks we humans, our
animals, and plants face today. Therefore, Dual Use Research of Concern
(DURC) cannot be understood in isolation. What follows is a short history of
the misuse –– and use –– of biology in what will always be a dangerous
world. We cannot reduce risk to zero, but we can increase safety, security,
and productivity in our laboratories without layering another set of

* Dr. David Franz, former Commander of the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Disease, retired as a Colonel from the U.S. Army in 1998. He served as a technical
expert and chief inspector during the termination of the Soviet and Iraqi biological weapons
programs in the early 1990s. Dr. Franz was a member of the National Academy of Sciences
“Fink” Committee on dual use technologies and is a founding member of the National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity. His current focus is responsible life sciences research
and the role of international engagement as a component of global biosecurity policy. Dr.
Franz holds a D.V.M. from Kansas State University and a Ph.D. in Physiology from Baylor
College of Medicine.
1. Ron A.M. Fouchier et al., Transmission Studies Resume for Avian Flu, 339 SCI. 520,
520 (2013). H5N1 is a subtype of the influenza A virus, known as “bird flu” or “highlypathogenic avian influenza.” It is sometimes designated “A/H5N1” or “A(H5N1).” It can
cause illness in humans and many animal species.
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regulations over the enterprise each time an individual scientist does
something thoughtless or even malevolent.
II. DURC BACKGROUND
A.

A Short History of Laboratory Biosafety –– 1940s Onward

The U.S. conducted offensive biological warfare research, development,
and field-testing from mid-1942 until late 1969, when President Nixon
traveled to Fort Detrick, Maryland, to announce that the U.S. would end its
biological weapons program.2 In two National Security memoranda, the first
dated November 25, 1969, and the second February 20, 1970, the U.S.
Government renounced development, production, and stockpiling of
biological weapons.3 Further, the U.S. declared its intent to maintain only
quantities of agents necessary for the development of vaccines, drugs, and
diagnostics.4 While I am convinced the weapons testing during the more
than 25 years of the offensive program demonstrated nuclear equivalence
of biological weapons, the real legacy of this program is the development
and implementation of the foundational principles of modern laboratory
biological safety.
During the 1960s, Dr. Arnold G. Wedum, M.D., Ph.D,5 Director of
Industrial Health and Safety at Fort Detrick, was the principal proponent and
leader of a system of containment facilities, equipment, and procedures
developed to greatly enhance the safety of the employees of the offensive
program and the rural community in which the core laboratories were
operated. Many of Dr. Wedum’s principles of biological safety served as the
basis for the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC)
publication called Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories
(BMBL).6 The BMBL is now updated regularly and has become the biosafety
bible in laboratories around the globe. Thus, in what we might today call a
reverse dual use model, some very important good has ultimately come
from a program that was designed to do harm.

2. David R. Franz et al., The U.S. Biological Warfare and Biological Defense Programs,
in TEXTBOOK OF MILITARY MEDICINE: MEDICAL ASPECTS OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
425, 431 (Russ Zatjchuk ed., 1997).
3. U.S. Nat’l Sec. Council, National Security Decision Memorandum 44 (Feb. 20,
1970) (on file with the National Security Archive); U.S. Nat’l Sec. Council, National Security
Decision Memorandum 35 (Nov. 25, 1969) (on file with the National Security Archive).
4. National Security Decision Memorandum 35, supra note 3.
5. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 430.
6. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., HHS PUB. NO. 21-1112, BIOSAFETY IN
MICROBIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL LABORATORIES 3 (5th ed. 2009).
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By the end of the twentieth century, the principles of biosafety ––
facilities, equipment, and procedures –– were codified, enhanced,
respected, and followed by the scientists in the relatively few highcontainment labs in the U.S. The original U.S. high-containment labs were
commissioned from 1971 to 1972 at Fort Detrick within the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID),7 and in
Atlanta at the CDC just a few years later.8
I served as Deputy Commander (1993–1995) and Commander (1995–
1998) of USAMRIID. My command briefings during the mid-90s often listed
three top priorities –– “biosafety, biosafety, and biosafety.” We had good
people in harm’s way during peacetime and in war in Biosafety Level-4
(BSL-4)9 labs where one needle stick, one bone fragment through a surgical
glove, or even the bite of an infected laboratory animal could mean almost
certain death to a scientist or technician. While the institute was located on
a fenced and guarded military installation with twenty-four hour unarmed
guards, as well as redundant locking systems with personal identification
number codes for laboratory suite entry, my focus was on the safety of the
employees and the community, as well as the productivity of our laboratory.
I learned in those six years that the same leadership approach that makes
people safe, makes an organization productive, and gives a community a
sense of well being, is based on nurturing a culture of responsibility and
trust.
B.

Laboratory Biosecurity –– Mid-90s and Beyond

In 1995, Mr. Larry Wayne Harris mailed a letter requesting an isolate of
Yersinia pestis (Y. pestis), the plague bacillus, from the American Type
Culture Collection (ATCC) in Manassas, Virginia.10 It was eventually

7. U.S. ARMY MED. RESEARCH INST. OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES, FACT SHEET (2012), available
at http://www.usamriid.army.mil/aboutpage.cfm.
8. Personal communication with Dr. Thomas Ksiazak, University of Texas, Galveston
National Labs (July 2013).
9. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 4. Biosafety Levels (1 – 4) are
used to describe combinations of facilities, equipment, and procedures that allow safe
handling of pathogens within a laboratory. The highest level (BSL-4) is used for the most
dangerous pathogens. In it, the air moving in and out is filtered to contain the viruses being
studies; scientists are protected by ‘space suits’ or special sealed hood lines. To the lay public,
I often describe BSL-1 as a high school science room, BSL-2 as a hospital clinical lab, BSL-3
as a containment lab for microbes for which we have vaccines or other effective medical
countermeasures, and BSL-4 as a similar lab but in which physical systems (space suits and
hood lines) are used to protect the people from bugs for which there are no or less effective
countermeasures.
10. TOXIC TERROR: ASSESSING TERRORIST USE OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
(Jonathan B. Tucker ed., 2000).
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discovered that the letterhead he used –– “Small Animal Microbiology
Laboratory, 266 Cleveland Avenue, Lancaster, Ohio” and the “Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency approval number 890” –– were
fraudulent.11 While the ATCC ultimately shipped the vials of Y. pestis, Mr.
Harris became impatient and called to follow up on his order. In doing so,
he alerted authorities and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) became
involved. While other incidents –– Aum Shinrikyo sarin attack in Tokyo on
March 20, 199512 and the B’nai B’rith incident in Washington D.C.
involving a petri dish of B. cereus in 199713 –– contributed to our increased
concern about both the illicit acquisition and malevolent use of biological
agents, it was the Harris incident that most greatly influenced our thinking
regarding laboratory biological security in the U.S.
The Select Agent Rule became law and was implemented in 1997.14
This new rule made the transfer between laboratories illegal for designated
bacteria, viruses, or toxins without CDC approval.15 Initially, the rule only
affected agent transfers,16 which meant that many academic and clinical
labs with select agent pathogens could maintain them without breaking the
law. Only after an inspection by the CDC (or, for some pathogens, the U.S.
Department of Agriculture) could a laboratory be certified to transfer
pathogens on the list, and then once certified, transfer only to a similarly
certified laboratory. The era of laboratory biosecurity had begun. As a result
of his actions, Harris, the individual most directly responsible for the Select
Agent Rule, was required to complete 200 hours of community service.
Legitimate research with the listed agents would forever be more costly and
probably less productive in government, academic, and industrial labs
where the new rules were promulgated.
C. DURC –– 2003 and Beyond
The World Trade Center attacks on September 11, 2001 (9/11), and
the first case of inhalational anthrax concerning the anthrax letters
discovered on October 4, 2001 (10/4), changed everything. The U.S.
biosecurity budget went from $137 million in 1997, to $14.5 billion spent

11. Id.
12. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, 2010 COUNTRY REP. ON TERRORISM, at 209.
13. Matthew L. Wald, Suspicious Package Prompts 8-Hour Vigil at B’nai B’rith, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 1997, at A12.
14. 42 C.F.R. § 73.16 (2012).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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on biodefense from 2001 to 2004.17 Soon many more laboratories sought
and received Select Agent certification.18
Today, it is almost impossible to put one’s mind back into the state of
infectious disease research before 2002, when thousands of new scientists
began working with this short list of threat agents. After 9/11, 10/4, and the
increased funding for new high-containment labs and Select Agent research,
the next layer of DURC regulation in the life sciences was beginning to
unfold. It would take another legitimate, even respected scientist,19 this time
not trying to do harm, but possibly for personal or professional gain, to
drive the U.S. Government to further regulate the traditional select agents
and influenza viruses.
About ten years before the 2012 controversy regarding the publication
of information on the intentional development of a recombinant H5N1
influenza virus transmissible between mammals, there was the reasonable
observation by the U.S. biological sciences community that it should “think
about policing itself” before the government intervened with undue
regulation. The now well-known Fink Report by the National Academies of
Science, Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism: The Dual-Use
Dilemma, was a direct result.20 At that time, factors that triggered the
perceived need for the study and subsequent report included: (1) a surprise
result of Australian attempts to design a rodent sterilization virus,21 (2) the
second de novo synthesis of poliovirus from a “web recipe,”22 and (3) a new
understanding of the implications of the Smallpox Inhibitor of Complement
Enzymes “SPICE gene” in orthopox viruses.23

17. Ari Schuler, Billions for Biodefense: Federal Agency Biodefense Funding: FY2001FY2005, 2 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 86, 86 (2004).
18. See James W. Blaine, Establishing a National Biological Laboratory Safety and
Security Monitoring Program, 10 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., &
SCI. 396, 397 (2012) (explaining that from 2002-2012, 400 laboratories were registered in
U.S.).
19. See, e.g., Sander Herfst et al., Airborne Transmission of Influenza A/H5N1 Virus
Between Ferrets, 336 SCI. 1534, 1538 (2012).
20. See COMMITTEE ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM vii (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT].
21. See Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant
Ectromelia Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Responses and Overcomes Genetic
Resistance to Mousepox, 75 J. VIROLOGY 1205, 1206 (2001).
22. See Eckard Wimmer, The Test-Tube Synthesis of a Chemical Called Poliovirus: The
Simple Synthesis of a Virus Has Far-Reaching Societal Implications, 7 EUROPEAN MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY ORG. REP. (SPECIAL ISSUE) S3, S8 (2006).
23. See Ariella M. Rosengard et al., Variola Virus Immune Evasion Design: Expression of
a Highly Efficient Inhibitor of Human Complement, 99 PROCEEDING OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI.
OF THE U.S. 8809, 8813 (2002).
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The nation was now working in a backdrop of 9/11 and 10/4,24 so
misuse of biology was on our minds. Although the term “dual use” had
been used in other settings, it was the Fink Report that really codified the
term in this context.25 The Fink Report also suggested that a national-level
committee be formed and composed of equal numbers of biology and
security experts to help the government cope with the dual use dilemma.26
The eventual response from the U.S. Government was the formation of the
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in 2004.27 Initially,
the NSABB described DUR as “research yielding new technologies or
information with the potential for both benevolent and malevolent
applications . . . .”28 Later, after realizing that a significant percentage of the
technology and knowledge in the life sciences enterprise could be used for
good or harm, the NSABB chose the term DURC to define a subset of dual
use knowledge and technologies. The NSABB described DURC as “research
that, based on current understanding, can be reasonably anticipated to
provide knowledge, products, or technologies that could be directly
misapplied by others to pose a threat to public health and safety,
agricultural crops and other plants, animals, the environment or materiel.”29
III. DURC DISCUSSION
A.

DURC Has Always Existed –– Just By Other Names

DURC is nothing new; it is not a product of the twenty-first century. It has
been around for tens or hundreds, maybe even thousands of years.
Remember fire? What about nuclear fission? I have a personal example.
During the mid to late-90s, a perfectly legitimate test of a potential antibody
therapy against a virus in a high-containment laboratory at USAMRIID
resulted in the natural development of resistance to the candidate therapy

24. See Gina Kolata, Florida Man Is Hospitalized With Pulmonary Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 5, 2001, at A16 (discussing Oct. 4, 2001, the day Mr. Stevens, a Florida man, was
diagnosed with inhalational anthrax).
25. See FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at vii-viii.
26. Dana A. Shea, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33342 OVERSIGHT OF DUAL-USE BIOLOGICAL
RESEARCH: THE NATIONAL SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY 2, 4 (2007), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33342.pdf.
27. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. ON BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING RESPONSIBLE SCIENCE
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND DISSEMINATION OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR DUAL
USE RESEARCH, 1, 30 (2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/documents/
COMBINED_Codes_PDFs.pdf.
28. NSABB Frequently Asked Questions, What is “Dual Use Research” and “Dual Use
Research of Concern”?, OFFICE OF SCI. POLICY-NIH, http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/nsabb
_faq.html (last visited Aug.17, 2013).
29. Id.
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being studied.30 The scientist, in whose laboratory it occurred, came to my
office and explained the finding. We simply pulled a small group of experts
together, examined the data, talked about the potential consequences, and
decided to put the entire experiment into the autoclave. That was it. We did
not hear anyone say, “Wow! We could get a paper in Science or Nature.”
The scientists involved had a personal sense of responsibility and I,
accepting the corporate responsibility, did not think twice about announcing
it at a scientific meeting or hyping it to the media. It was not called DURC,
but just another surprise from biology. These unexpected outcomes are part
of what makes our professional experience so rewarding. I have often said,
“It is why we call it biology after all.” There are many more benign surprises
in biology than potentially malignant ones. Many scientists have spent the
greater part of their lives trying to do good things with biology, and it is
hard. My experience talking with former biological weapons scientists
suggests that doing really bad things with biology is not that easy either.
In the past, when surprises occurred in biology or any of the sciences,
responsible scientists typically acted responsibly, neither trying to gain undue
attention for themselves nor seeking to misuse the new information. There
have been, and will always be, irresponsible or even criminal minds in all
professions and societies, but the vast majority of humans involved in the life
sciences will continue to contribute positively for the good of mankind.
B.

What Has Changed in the U.S. and the World?

Dartmouth Professor Kendall Hoyt, Ph.D., in her book, Long Shot, asked
the questions: “Why was the U.S. Government so successful in developing
and fielding vaccines from the 1940s through the 1950s, and why has it
been so difficult in recent years?”31 It cannot be the technologies, which
have been greatly improved during the period in which progress in fielding
has slowed. One would expect us to be better and faster today than 50
years ago. It turns out there may be several factors that explain the earlier
successes and difficulties today. For example, simpler technologies and less
complex approval protocols. However, Dr. Hoyt made two other important
conclusions, which suggest more behavioral than technical explanations.
First, she learned that “champion-led research,” in which a single,
dedicated individual shepherds a vaccine candidate from the bench all the
way through development, clinical trials, and licensure, was much more
common.32 Second, Dr. Hoyt learned that those champions were working

30. This passage is my personal recollection. It occurred between 1995 and 1998.
31. See KENDALL HOYT, LONG SHOT VACCINES FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE 2, 4 (Harvard Univ.
Press 2012).
32. Id. at 5.
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within “collaborative communities.”33 In these communities, scientists
worked in teams and openly shared helpful information within and between
those teams, even if this information might help make competitors
successful.
A likely major contributor to both the motivation of the champions and
the formation of communities was the patriotism and sense of urgency of a
nation at war during World War II (WWII). Many of the scientists who had
served their country in military laboratories, such as the Walter Reed Army
Institute of Research, then moved to commercial enterprise. The motivation
and cultural norm in the workplace that was learned under excellent
leadership in a time of great national struggle likely contributed to the burst
of commercial productivity after the war. It is my belief that leadership and
communities of trust not only lead to more productivity, but also reduce the
potential impact of DURC and even the threat of insider misconduct or
criminality.
Possibly the most troubling development in some of our government
laboratories in the last ten to fifteen years has been the separation of
responsibility and authority. Individuals in the laboratory are powerfully
motivated and have increased productivity levels when authority and
responsibility are balanced. We are losing this balance and the kind of
supercharging that results. Beginning in the Department of Defense (DOD)
before 9/11 and spreading to other government security laboratories, this
authority to make decisions locally has been pulled to within the beltway,
while responsibility has stayed with the laboratories. Relatively inexperienced
managers are now often assigned to manage research project portfolios
within the laboratories from afar. In the past, laboratory directors or
commanders were selected from a vibrant pool of scientists all considered to
be technical, subject-matter experts and tested or potential leaders. They
knew their programs, were dedicated to their missions and loved their
people. Today, good people hold some of those positions with leadership
experience from other military sectors, but lack technical credibility. In other
cases, qualified leaders are given responsibility, but adequate authority to
do their jobs is withheld.
C. We are No Longer Alone
The biological playing field, both with regard to disease and progress
toward controlling disease, is enormous, complex, extremely dynamic,
competitive, and global. Like the rest of the sciences, technical advances in
biology are incremental, but cumulative, and generally not reversible.34 One

33. Id. at 6.
34. The general concept drawn from discussions with Roger Brent (Feb 2013).
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cannot put the toothpaste of the global life sciences enterprise back in the
tube. Like physical and chemical phenomena in nature, biological ones
challenge us as a human race and exact a toll on health and life. More than
nine million of the fifty million plus people who die globally each year die of
infectious diseases.35 Plant losses from pests and pathogens alone are
believed to result in monetary losses of approximately $20 to 33 billion
annually in the U.S., so the challenges of disease are not only related
directly to humans.36
1. Natural and Intentional Disease
Our experience with intentional disease –– biological warfare, terrorism,
and crime –– is much more limited than our experience with naturally
occurring disease. Historians believe at least 10,000 to 12,000 Chinese
died from biological warfare attacks by the Japanese during WWII.37 We
know that five humans died as a result of the anthrax letters sent through the
U.S. mail system in 2001.38 Biological agents have also been used to kill
humans in what most would consider biocrimes. The majority of those
crimes involved contamination of food with biological toxins or replicating
agents.39 The relative emphasis the government placed on these health risks
varied with the perception of them; the perception held by politicians and
the news media are particularly powerful.

35. WORLD HEALTH ORG., WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1996: FIGHTING DISEASE FOSTERING
DEVELOPMENT 1 (1996).
36. CALVIN O. QUALSET & HENRY L. SHANDS, SAFEGUARDING THE FUTURE OF U.S.
AGRICULTURE: THE NEED TO CONSERVE THREATENED COLLECTIONS OF CROP DIVERSITY WORLDWIDE
7 (2005).
37. Judith Miller, When Germ Warfare Happened, 20 CITY JOURNAL 86, 86 (Spring
2010).
38. JEANNE GUILLEMIN, AMERICAN ANTHRAX: FEAR, CRIME, AND THE INVESTIGATION OF THE
NATION’S DEADLIEST BIOTERROR ATTACK, xx-xxi (Henry Holt & Co. 2011).
39. W. SETH CARUS, BIOTERRORISM AND BIOCRIMES: THE ILLICIT USE OF BIOLOGICAL AGENTS
SINCE 1900, 19-20 (Minerva Grp. 2002) (1998).
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The above figure represents the relative impact in lives lost from
unintentional disease and the intentional misuse of biology. Regardless of
how you define the anthrax letter attacks, whether as misuse or terrorism,
there were five deaths as a result of that intentional event. DURC examples
can be found across most of this space, as can insider threat potential. The
risk-threat spectrum, as shown above, is ever changing, making the analysis
of requirements for preparedness, response, recovery, and policy very
difficult. Understanding what to do about intentional health threats is even
more difficult than planning for natural risks and threats.
2. Health and Security
Both health and security are of interest to government decision makers
and decision influencers. The funding they provide to protect the population
depends on their perception of the threat or risk. It also appears that in
biology, government decision makers often prefer funding response
measures rather than preventive measures, regardless of whether they are
seeking health or security. When HIV and AIDS were discovered, Congress
called for huge increases in funding for health. When 9/11 and 10/4
occurred, massive increases in funding occurred, this time for security. The
National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease’s (NIAID) annual budget
for biosecurity was increased from essentially zero dollars to $1.7 billion
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after the anthrax letters in 2001.40 But when no further attacks occurred in
the next five to ten years, the program’s emphasis changed from traditional
threat agents toward emerging infectious diseases.41
3. The Advance of Technologies
Biotechnology, and the knowledge that derives from it, has been
increasing at a phenomenal rate for the past 20 years.42 Rob Carlson, a
biotechnology futurist, has calculated that genetically modified systems
generated more than $300 billion, or two percent Gross Domestic Product
for the U.S economy in 2010.43 Just as new biological knowledge builds on
previous knowledge, so too, the biotech revolution was built on previous
revolutions in transportation and communication. In 1999, Harvard
Professor Matthew Messelsen, Ph.D., a major influence on President Nixon
who renounced biological weapons, said, “Every major technology ––
metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, electronics, nuclear
energy –– has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes but
also for hostile ones. Must this also happen with biotechnology, certain to
be a dominant technology of the [twenty-first] century?”44 His concerns were
as much prophetic as they were a warning. Dr. Messelsen made the
statement in the very early days of molecular biology; our capabilities and
knowledge have now caught up with his concerns. This is particularly true in
the twenty-first century, but there has not been a massive loss of life as a
result of intentional misuse of these powerful tools.
D. Biological Warfare, Terrorism, and Crimes
While relatively few humans or animals have died of intentional misuse
of biology in modern times, several governments, non-government groups,

40. See Anthony S. Fauci et al., Emerging Infectious Diseases: A 10-Year Perspective from
the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, 17 INT’L J. RISK & SAFETY 157, 159,
164 (2005).
41. See David R. Franz, Preparedness for an Anthrax Attack, 30 MOLECULAR ASPECT MED.
503, 504. This was not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it might have been wiser to fund both
the traditional threat agent countermeasures and those for the emerging diseases from the
outset. See id. at 504-07.
42. See ROBERT H. CARLSON, BIOLOGY IS TECHNOLOGY: THE PROMISE, PERIL, AND NEW
BUSINESS OF ENGINEERING LIFE, 233 (Harvard Univ. Press 2010).
43. Robert H. Carlson, Biodesic 2011 Bioeconomy Update: U.S. Revenues from
Genetically Modified Systems Now $300 Billion, or Greater than 2% of GDP, SYNTHESIS (Aug.
15, 2011, 11:18 AM), http://www.synthesis.cc/2011/08/biodesic-2011-bioeconomy-updateus-revenues-from-genetically-modified-systems-now-300-billion-or-gre.html.
44. Matthew Meselson, Professor, Harvard Univ., Presentation on The Problem of
Biological Weapons at the 1818th Stated Meeting of the American Academy of Arts and
Sciences (Jan. 13, 1999), available at http://www.pugwash.org/reports/cbw/cbw5.htm.
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and even individuals have developed biological weapons or conducted
research toward that end.
1. Enormous State-Sponsored Biological Warfare Programs But Little
Actual Use
Evidence shows that during WWII the Japanese conducted wide-ranging
human experiments with biological agents and also conducted focal attacks
on a number of Chinese villages. These activities are chronicled in a book
that takes the name of the Japanese military unit involved, Unit 731.45 The
records of this secret unit, then headquartered near Harbin, China, were
handed over to American forces in exchange for leniency toward the
perpetrators.46 While the U.S. may have hoped to apply lessons learned
from the unit’s reports to bolster its own biological warfare program, the
consensus is that Japan’s research was of little value, as it was far from
scientific.47 In many cases, the number of test subjects per study group was
one or just a few, making the data analysis impossible.48 Describing what
appeared to be more of a random torture campaign against Chinese and
allied prisoners than a research program, the records were soon filed in the
U.S. archives where they remain today.49 The Japanese attacks themselves,
the most famous of which involved clay pots filled with rice and Y. pestis
infected fleas dropped on Chinese villages from the air, were described in
2005, by a young officer of the Peoples Liberation Army.50 Until very
recently, the Chinese sought reparations from the Japanese for these
attacks. The Japanese government has apparently now acknowledged that
they did occur.51 Many find it surprising to learn that these poorly
understood attacks on Chinese villages over 70 years ago are the largest
biological attacks undertaken by a state in the modern era.
In April 1942, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson recommended the
creation of a U.S. civilian advisory group to coordinate government and
non-governmental organizations in a biological warfare effort to President

45. See PETER WILLIAMS & DAVID WALLACE, UNIT 731: JAPAN’S SECRET BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
(Free Press, 1st ed. 1989).
46. See id. at 202-219, 235.
47. See id. at 257-266.
48. Personal communication with William C. Patrick, III, expert in germ and biological
warfare (late 1990s).
49. See U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., SELECT DOCUMENTS ON JAPANESE WAR
CRIMES AND JAPANESE BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 3, 1934-2006, available at http://archives.gov/
iwg/japanese-war-crimes/select-documents.pdf.
50. Id. at 5. See also LI XIAOFANG, BLOOD-WEEPING ACCUSATIONS: RECORDS OF ANTHRAX
VICTIMS (2005).
51. Personal Communication with Wang Xuan, a Chinese activist, in Beijing (Sept. 2012).
IN WORLD WAR II
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Franklin Roosevelt.52 The War Reserve Service, headed by George W.
Merck, was established under the Federal Security Agency, part of the
Department of Agriculture at the time. Secret work, under Mr. Merck’s
direction in 1942, involved 28 U.S. universities including, Harvard and
Stanford, with a budget of $200,000.53 What President Roosevelt did not
know was that the U.S. Army Chemical Corps had already begun exploring
biological weapons in 1941.54 Eventually, it was the Army that became the
larger part of the nation’s offensive program with millions of dollars in
funding and several geographic sites at locations including, a research
facility at Camp Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, a manufacturing plant at
Terre Haute, Indiana, and a 2,000-acre field test site at Horn Island,
Mississippi.55 The U.S. build-up was in response to concerns over a
biological weapons program in Germany in WWII, yet it was the Japanese
that should have been the main concern.
By 1943, the programs at Camp Detrick employed “3,800 military and
100 civilian personnel.”56 During WWII, the U.S. exchanged technical
information with Canada and Great Britain, both of which had their own
offensive programs. In 1944, Dugway Proving Ground, Utah, replaced the
Mississippi test site (the Utah site is used today to test environmental sensors,
decontamination techniques and equipment as countermeasures to
biological weapons).57 “In January 1946, the [U.S. Government] made
public for the first time the fact that [it] had been conducting biological
warfare research, [development], and testing.”58 In 1953, an agreement
was signed between the Army Chemical Corps and the U.S. Army Medical
Department to collaborate on the development of medical countermeasures
for the military force in parallel with the offensive program.59 By the mid1950s, the large weapons complex at Camp Detrick included a pilot plant
and a special operations division.60 Until the offensive program ended in
1969, the medical department continued its work, and the Chemical Corps
worked on developing biological weapons and conducting large-scale field
tests in the continental U.S., Alaska, and the Pacific.61
In retrospect, we knew that the offensive program demonstrated that
biological warfare was truly feasible, and a more recent analysis of original
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Franz et al., supra note 2, at 426.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 427.
Franz et al., supra note 2, at 427.
Id.
Id. at 428.
Id.
See id. at 431.
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documents supports the argument that the biological program achieved
nuclear equivalence in killing power.62 “In response to President Nixon’s
decision in 1969, all [agent] stocks were destroyed within a year, between
May 1971 to May 1972.”63 The Terre Haute plant was sold to the Pfizer
Company, the Pine Bluff, Arkansas facility was converted to the National
Center for Toxicological Research,64 and most of Fort Detrick’s facilities
were eventually turned over to the National Institutes of Health’s (NIH)
National Cancer Institute. In 1967, the Army broke ground at Fort Detrick
for a new medical defense research facility, which would become
USAMRIID.65 USAMRIID’s new mission was to “conduct studies related to
medical defensive aspects of biological agents of military importance and
develop appropriate biological protective measures, diagnostic procedures,
and therapeutic methods.”66 After 9/11, USAMRIID would come to national
prominence. First, for its exceptional and unique role in analyzing samples
in support of response and recovery from the anthrax letters attacks, and
second, as the home laboratory of Bruce Ivins, Ph.D., the person of interest
who took his own life as the FBI was about to charge him as the mailer of
those letters.67
The former Soviet Union also had an offensive biological weapons (BW)
program that was the largest and most comprehensive in history, and almost
certainly the largest the world will ever know. Its size and level of funding
greatly increased throughout the 1970s and 1980s, just after the Soviet
Union, like the U.S., signed and ratified the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) in 1972 and 1975, respectively.68 While intelligence communities in

62. Personal communication with William C. Patrick, III, expert in germ and biological
warfare (Fall 2010) and Dr. Robert P. Kadlec (Sep. 2013).
63. Id.
64. About Food and Drug Administration, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.
gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OC/OfficeofScientificandMedicalPrograms/NCTR/WhatWeDo
/FacilitiesServices/ucm121463.htm (last updated Sept. 9, 2012) (explaining the location of
the Arkansas facility).
65. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 431. The current USAMRIID facility broke ground in
1967 and opened in phases in 1971 and 1972. It is currently scheduled to be replaced by a
new facility on the same campus at Fort Detrick, MD and the move to the new facility is
scheduled to begin in 2014. Id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT: REAL PROPERTY MASTER PLAN FOR ARMY-CONTROLLED LAND AT AREAS A AND C OF
FORT DETRICK IN FREDERICK COUNTY, MARYLAND 30 (2010), http://www.detrick.army.mil/emo/
ea/AreasACMP EA.pdf.
66. Franz et al., supra note 2, at 431.
67. Guillemin, supra note 39, at 2-3, 106.
68. Biological Weapons Convention Signatories and States-Parties, ARMS CONTROL ASS’N,
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwcsig (last updated April 2013). See also Raymond
A. Zilinskas, The Anti-Plague System and the Soviet Biological Warfare Program, 32 CRITICAL
REVIEWS IN MICROBIOLOGY 47, 49 (2006).
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the free world were aware of the program, the public knew little until
February 13, 1980.69 Public awareness occurred globally when a German
magazine, Bild-Zeitung, carried the story of an accident at a military facility
in Sverdlovsk, Russia.70 The story was confirmed, and it soon became clear,
that there had been at least 64 deaths from anthrax71 and a massive coverup by Soviet military and political authorities. It was at this point that Dr.
Messelson led a team to Sverdlovsk to attempt to better understand what
had happened.72
We would later learn from defectors, Vladimir Pasechnik, who sought
asylum in the United Kingdom (U.K.) in 1989, and Ken Alibek in the U.S. in
1992,73 that the Soviet enterprise was massive, far larger, and more
advanced than that of the U.S. A strategic turning point in the Western
search for evidence of a Soviet program came with the discovery of an
enormous B. anthracis spore production capability in Stepnagorsk,
Kazakhstan.74 It was Alibek, through a popular book, Biohazard, who first
described the Soviet program in great detail.75 We learned of several
military biological warfare facilities and a network of at least 18 generally
non-military research institutes and plants called Biopreparat.76 Biopreparat
was created in 1973, just after the Soviet Union signed the BWC.77 Alibek,
Biopreparat’s Deputy Director in 1992, estimated there were 30,000
scientists, engineers, and technicians in the whole program.78
69. TOM MANGOLD & JEFF GOLDBERG, PLAGUE WARS: THE TERRIFYING REALITY OF
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 73, 406 (2001).
70. JUDITH MILLER ET AL., GERMS: BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND AMERICA’S SECRET WAR 76
(2001).
71. MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 70, at 70.
72. See Matthew Meselson et al., The Sverdlovsk Anthrax Outbreak of 1979, 266 SCI.
1202 (1994).
73. See Linda Kozaryn, Former Soveits’ Bio-War Expert Details Threat, U.S. DEP’T OF
DEFENSE (Nov. 3, 1999), http://www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID=42946 (the
U.S. production capacity was on the order of one ton of a given agent per year, while the
Soviet capacity was 100 to 1,000 tons per year). See also Vladimir Pasechnik, TEL., Nov. 29,
2011, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/1363752/Vladimir-Pasech
nik.html.
74. See DAVID E. HOFFMAN, THE DEAD HAND: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE COLD WAR ARMS
RACE AND ITS DANGEROUS LEGACY 463-64 (2009) (describing the discovery of the Soviet
anthrax plant at Stepnogorsk, Kazachstan, negotiations for entry, and ultimate destruction of
the facility).
75. See KEN ALIBEK, BIOHAZARD: THE CHILLING TRUE STORY OF THE LARGEST COVERT
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM IN THE WORLD –– TOLD FROM INSIDE BY THE MAN WHO RAN IT
(1999) (Random House NY).
76. See id.
77. Jonathan B. Tucker, Biological Weapons in the Former Soviet Union: An Interview with
Dr. Kenneth Alibek. 4 THE NONPROLIFERATION REVIEW 5 (1999).
78. Id. at 6.
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After the 1991 collapse of the former Soviet Union, Ministry of Defense
funding for biological warfare programs diminished to almost nothing. In
April 1992, President Yeltsin publicly outlawed biological weapons in
Russia.79 On October 5, 1993, the day after Yeltsin’s constitutional crisis
and the attacks on the Russian White House, the first team of joint U.S./U.K.
inspectors, in support of the Trilateral Agreement, began their visits to
Biopreparat facilities.80 It was my first of what would be many trips to Russia
over the next ten years.
I see the following anecdote as unique and one of the most impactful
experiences in my career with regard to the way I think about arms control
and international engagement.
It was January 1994, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) building in
Moscow. I was involved as a technical expert in the ongoing Trilateral
Agreement discussions and negotiations. The Russians faced us from across
a large table while our U.S./U.K. delegation worked from the side with the
sun in our eyes. Much of the discussion addressed ground rules for the visits:
how many sites, what could be covered with a tarp or screen and called
proprietary, how many members of each team would be allowed, could
samples be taken, and what was the protocol for sampling? We got to a part
of the bracketed text that was mostly technical. The head of our delegation
turned to me and said, “Colonel Franz, you and Colonel Pickavich go into
the next room and work on this part of the text — it is only science.” My
partner was a uniformed M.D., Ph.D. from the Russian Army. We went to the
next room, reconciled our texts, and returned to the delegation that was still
debating the mechanics. Our brackets were gone and it had been easy
because it was only science. At the next break, my new friend and I
wandered toward each other and were soon talking about our scientific
interests and even about our families. That experience, so brief yet so
powerful, changed the way I thought about international engagement and
biological security. I realized that science and public health provide a
common language and that working toward trust can tear down superficial,
but sometimes very resilient, political barriers. I had not heard of DURC at
the time, and had only given minimal thought to the insider threat, but my
experience at the MFA would impact my thinking on how to deal with the
more subtle challenges we face today.81

79. THE GATHERING BIOLOGICAL WARFARE STORM 170 (Jim A. Davis & Barry R. Schneider
eds., 2004).
80. See Serge Schmemann, Revolt in Moscow: How Yeltsin Turned the Tide, Hour by
Hour, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1993, at A1, A6; MANGOLD & GOLDBERG, supra note 70, at 197.
81. Names were changed for confidentially.
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When the Trilateral Agreement visits and negotiations eventually ground
to a halt, collapsing under the weight of mistrust on both sides, U.S.
Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar demonstrated visionary leadership
by stepping into the gap with a most thoughtful, and at that time, politically
risky idea: The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program of
1991.82 Actually, the establishment of this program predates the failure of
the Trilateral Agreement. Did the Senators anticipate the Trilateral’s failure
or just realize there was not a mandate to try to force the Russians to admit
they had been conducting an illicit BW program for 20 years? Whatever
their motivations, it was the right response at the right time in history.

The following timeline summarizes major events of the five-year period
during which both the Soviet Union and Iraqi BW programs were under
great scrutiny by the West. The U.S. and U.K. were involved in the Trilateral
Agreement visits and were key players in the United Nations Special
Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) visits.

82. See Nunn-Lugar Global Cooperation Initiative, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY &
USSTRATCOM CENTER FOR COMBATING WMD & STANDING JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERSELIMINATION, available at http://www.dtra.mil/Missions/nunn-lugar/nunn-lugar-home.aspx
(last visited Sep. 17, 2013).
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The early 1990s was a time of winding down state-sponsored weapons
programs. Interspersed between trips to Russia and London for the Trilateral
Agreement related negotiations, I traveled to Baghdad where I served as
Chief Inspector for three UNSCOM’s biological warfare missions. The
purpose of these inspection missions was to implement United Nations
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687, an effort to assure the
uncovering and removal of Saddam Hussein’s offensive biological warfare
program.83 It turns out that the Iraqi program probably began in the early
1980s when equipment was purchased from Germany, and pathogen
strains from France and the U.S.84 Some of the strains were used for
legitimate medical countermeasure development and others, notably B.
anthracis and C. botulinum, for weapons development.85 The Iraqis worked
with other bacterial and viral strains, but in the end, they weaponized just
anthrax, botulinum toxin, and aflatoxin.86
The program was discovered during the First Gulf War, but production
of agents had been ramped up before the war, probably beginning in
1989.87 The main research center, Salman Pak, was destroyed during early
bombing. The production site at Al Hakam, unknown to the West during the
bombing raids, was later destroyed by the United Nations (U.N.). The other
key facility, Al Manal Foot and Mouth Disease Center, was preserved
because of its potential value to the country for legitimate agricultural use.
Tim Trevan, an individual actively involved in many of the early inspections,
wrote the first comprehensive popular account of the program and the
activities of UNSCOM.88 In Mr. Trevan’s book, Saddam’s Hidden Secrets,
published in 1999, he provides an on-the-ground, inspector’s eye-view of
the very difficult task of definitively identifying small-scale offensive
biological developments by a nation state.89
E.

Non-State Misuse of Biology

While states planned and prepared for biological warfare, they almost
never used the weapons they developed. We learned of non-state plans and
programs only after the rather primitive weapons were used. Three major
non-state crimes, none causing loss of life like that seen with chemical

83. See S.C. Res. 687, ¶¶ 8(a), 10, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. A/RES/687 (April 3, 1991),
available at http://www.un.org/docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm.
84. See TIM TREVAN, SADDAM’S SECRETS: THE HUNT FOR IRAQ’S HIDDEN WEAPONS 341, 343
(1999).
85. See id.
86. See id. (describing types of chemical weapons the Iraqi worked with).
87. See id. at 341 (describing the timeline of production of agents).
88. See id. at i, 1.
89. See TREVAN, supra note 84, at ix-x.
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crimes, influenced our thinking about threats and risks near the end of the
twentieth century. The first, in 1984, resulted in the food poisoning of more
than 700 individuals in The Dalles, Oregon.90 The fact that it took the CDC
a year to discover that it was not a natural foodborne outbreak is a
significant measure of how we perceived risk from intentional misuse of
biology just 30 years ago. While there had been previous criminal
biological activity in the U.S. and other countries, particularly Japan, the
Oregon attack was by far the largest with the contamination of at least ten
restaurant salad bars with salmonella bacteria.91
It turns out that the followers of Bhagwan Shree Rajneesh, an eccentric
philosopher and modern-day interpreter of mysticism and religions,
conducted the attack for political reasons.92 They hoped to incapacitate part
of the largest voting block in the county to give themselves an advantage in
an election for members of a county court.93 It appears that up to one dozen
people were involved in either planning or executing the plot.94 The
contamination of salad bars was a trial run, as they were also planning to
contaminate the water supply, but apparently never did.95 The fact that so
many people were involved and the perpetrators were not discovered for
many months underscores the extremely poor awareness of biological
crimes among our political leaders, health officials, citizens, and even the
media. It is also interesting to note that after the adulteration of salad bars
by the Rajneesh cult, the U.S. Government did not respond with new policies
or legislation.
Fearing copycat attacks, federal and state investigators requested that
the Journal of the American Medical Association not publish a record of the
incident, and the journal complied.96 Judith Miller, a former New York Times
correspondent and Pulitzer Prize winning author, and her colleagues
published the story of the above attacks years later in the book Germs.97
This forgotten incident occurred long before the Fink Report, before NSABB
discussions occurred regarding DURC, and before we seriously considered
the implications of the publication of threat techniques or public
vulnerabilities. By standards of today, there was little media attention given.
90. Joseph E. McDade & David Franz, Bioterrorism as a Public Health Threat, 4
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 493, 493 (1998).
91. Id. See also CARUS, supra note 40.
92. See CARUS, supra note 40, at 50.
93. Id. at 52.
94. Id. at 53.
95. See id. at 56-57.
96. LAURIE GARRETT, BETRAYAL OF TRUST: THE COLLAPSE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC HEALTH 535
(2000).
97. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 71, at 19 (describing the food poisoning attacks by the
Rajneesh cult).
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The second incident before 9/11, which had a significant impact on our
thinking and awareness of the risks of biological attacks, was a chemical
attack. In 1995, ten years after the incident in Oregon, followers of Shoko
Asahara, called the Aum Shinrikyo (Aum), an eccentric and powerful group,
carried out a gas attack on Tokyo’s subway system.98 The attack used crude
sarin gas that was delivered by a very simple, improvised device.99 This
attack killed 13 commuters, seriously injured more than 50, and affected
nearly 1,000.100 It followed an earlier sarin attack, in mid-1994, in which
seven people died and two hundred became ill.101
The cult’s religious organizational status, gained in 1989, may have
offered some protection in Japanese society.102 The Aum’s broader activities
demonstrated behavior even more bizarre than the Rajneehes had displayed
ten years prior in the Oregon attacks. In addition to several kidnappings
and assassinations conducted by members, the cult traveled to Australia to
field-test their sarin on animals.103 They also traveled to Russia to acquire
military equipment, reportedly even seeking components for a nuclear
weapon.104 The illicit biological activity for which they are best known is the
release of a bacillus species in July 1993, from the top of a Tokyo
building.105 It was later learned that the anthrax was not virulent, and that
the steam device used was not an effective means of dissemination. While
the Aum’s signature attack was with a chemical, not a biological agent, it
clearly had a wake up effect on U.S. policymakers, public health community
leaders, and the media.
The third incident in this series, while much less impactful than the two
previously mentioned, had a galvanizing impact on U.S. law enforcement
and legislative communities. No one died, no pathogens were used, but Mr.

98. CARUS, supra note 40, at 49-50.
99. Holly Fletcher, Aum Shinrikyo (Japan, Cultists, Aleph, Aum Supreme Truth), COUNCIL
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, June 19, 2012, at 3, http://www.cfr.org/japan/aum-shinrikyo/p9238.
Sarin is one of the more volatile organophosphate chemical warfare agents, previously
weaponized by several governments. Id.
100. See Hiroko Tabuchi, Suspect in ‘95 Tokyo Attack is Said to be Caught, N.Y. TIMES,
June 15, 2012, at A10.
101. Nicholas D. Kristof, Terror in Tokyo: The Overview, Hundreds in Japan Hunt Gas
Attackers after 8 Die, Security Tight – Rider Seen as Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, March 21, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0320.html.
102. AMY E. SMITHSON & LESLIE-ANNE LEVY, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CTR., ATAXIA: THE
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM THREAT AND THE US RESPONSE 110 (2000), available at
http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/atxchapter3.pdf.
103. RICHARD DANZIG ET AL., AUM SHINRIKYO: INSIGHTS INTO HOW TERRORISTS DEVELOP
BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS, CTR. FOR A NEW AM. SECURITY, 47 (2011), available at
http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_0.pdf.
104. Id. at 18, 27.
105. Id. at 56, 18 n.112.
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Harris’106 request to the ATCC for an isolate of Y. pestis led to new
legislation.107 This new legislation made the act of transferring certain
pathogens between laboratories a crime, and made work more difficult for
the scientists and laboratories who conducted research with these agents.108
Harris was required to complete 200 hours of community service and
laboratories were given the Select Agent Rule, the law prohibiting transfer of
a defined group of biological agents between laboratories not certified for
such actions by the U.S. Government. The rules would continue and
become more onerous for years after the 200 hours of service served by Mr.
Harris passed.
Why the need for the Select Agent Rule, a regulatory response that
seemed at the time too far-reaching for the crime, or actually, no-crime?
Probably because we were primed. We had seen the enormity of the Soviet
program in significant detail, now understood the Rajneesh salad bar attack
and the terror impact of the Aum’s sarin attacks, had learned of the Iraqi
offensive program, and were in the midst of planning for the Summer
Olympics in Atlanta. Still on active duty and commanding USARMIID, I
recall this as the time that our own thinking expanded and, in a sense,
shifted from a focus on protecting our forces on a distant European
battlefield to protecting our citizens at home. We made it through the
Olympics Games in Atlanta mostly unscathed, at least biologically, but we
continued to think about the domestic threat and to enhance our
preparations.
1. And then Everything Changed Forever
We all know where we stood gazing at a television screen as the second
plane slammed into the World Trade Center on that clear September
morning. The next few minutes wrung some innocence out of the American
culture that will likely never return. In the memories of those who have
dedicated their lives to the security of the nation, there is a bright line
through the events of 9/11.109

106. See generally Beyond Anthrax: Extremists and the Bioterrorism Threat: The Harris
Hoax, ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE (2001) (describing background information on Larry Wayne
Harris as a biological extremist) available at http://archive.adl.org/learn/anthrax/Harris.Asp?
xpicked=3&item=5.
107. GERALD L. MANDELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES 3965
(Gerald L. Mandell et al. eds., 7th ed. 2010).
108. See Select Agent Regulations 42 CFR § 73 (1997) (relating to public health).
109. I sat next to Barbara Hatch-Rosenberg in a meeting in Washington D.C. all day on
the 10th of September, the day before the WTC attacks. Oddly, Dr. Hatch-Rosenberg would
later speculate on the Federation of American Scientists website that “Col. David R. Franz and
his cronies, if they weren’t involved in the anthrax letters, would very likely know who was.”
[paraphrased]. See Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Analysis of the Anthrax Attacks, FED’N OF AM.
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Just three weeks after 9/11, I was in New York City preparing for a
taping of CBS’s 60 Minutes with Mike Osterholm, Matthew Messelson, and
Richard Butler. As I sat in a makeup chair, Mike Wallace walked up behind
me holding, as I recall, several linked, perforated pages that looked like
they came from a telex machine. He said, “Dr. Franz, there’s a wire report
of a case of inhalational anthrax in a Florida man. What do you think?” My
response was too quick, “No way! We haven’t had a case of inhalational
anthrax in this country since 1978!” I have often relived that moment and
thought to myself, “Wow! If I wasn’t prepared for that at that very time in
history, who was? For Pete’s sake, it was my job!”
Later that evening, I left John F. Kennedy International Airport for
Moscow. When I connected with my wife by email a few days later, she
informed me that our friend, Judy Miller, had called to talk with me. Judy
had received a letter containing some granular powder in her office at the
New York Times. By the time I returned to the U.S., we were in the midst of a
response to the biological event that would further change our lives and our
life sciences enterprise forever.
2. The Anthrax Letters
The so-called anthrax letters changed much of the world I had come to
know so well over the previous 14 years. Life at USAMRIID had been very
different in the 1990s. We had come through some really hard times
together. The Clinton peace-dividend right-sizing of the military force had
resulted in salami-slicing cuts of personnel and funding. We had been
forced to reduce our military and civilian workforce by 31% from 1991
through 1997.110 We were able to cut many staff by attrition, as well as
offering early retirement packages,111 but I was forced to fire the last 17
people, many my personal friends, due to a reduction in force. That had
been a nightmare for me, but also a lesson regarding the basic goodness of
people. Some told me on the spot, almost apologetically, that they knew
how hard it was for me. Others later wrote letters saying they had landed on
their feet and not to worry.
We were also constantly strapped for funds. Just one year before I was
to finish my tour as commander of USAMRIID, our initial funding for fiscal
year 1997 had been $18 million. It took about $16 million to run the very

SCIENTISTS (January 17-31, 2002), http://www.911review.org/Wget/www.fas.org/bwc
/news/anthraxreport.htm (commenting on the FBI’s knowledge of the anthrax killer).
110. This information comes from my personal recollection.
111. See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., GUIDE TO VOLUNTARY EARLY RETIREMENT
REGULATIONS (2006); U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MGMT., GUIDE TO VOLUNTARY SEPARATION
INCENTIVE PAYMENTS (2006) (stating the guidelines to follow when offering early retirement and
separation incentive payments).
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complex and unique high-containment infectious disease laboratories and
to pay civilian salaries, leaving only $2 million for research. I wrote a formal
request to my higher command asking to furlough one-half of the civilian
workforce to free up funds for research. In response, we received another
$1.5 to $2 million for research.112 Those lean times were good for us, and
good for me as the commander, I had a great boss who gave me authority
commensurate with my responsibility, and supported me. There was a sense
that we, the military and civilian employees, were in this together; we were a
team, a family. We not only survived, but also prospered. The patriotic,
hard-working employees made enormous strides in diagnostics for
biological warfare agents, education of healthcare providers, and amazing
advances in basic and preclinical research supporting the development of
vaccines for the force.
I walked out of the USAMRIID late one Sunday night in the summer of
1998, with the last box of books from my office in my arms and tears
dripping from my chin. I loved the USAMRIID, the mission, and the people. I
still have a homemade bumper sticker that I placed on my command suite
bulletin board during the most difficult times: “Someday, we’ll look back
and say it was fun.” And I have many, many times. As my wife and I formally
said goodbye in the Dalrymple Conference Room, I told my friends, “It is not
the science, but you people I will remember.” I was right.
When the anthrax letters arrived at the various media and government
offices, the frenzy began. At this point, I still knew the leadership and most of
the staff at USAMRIID very well. In addition to receiving some of the actual
letters for analysis, suddenly my friends were inundated with samples of
unknown white powders from all over the country. They worked in roundthe-clock shifts to handle the increased workload and processed more
anthrax samples than any other laboratory in the nation. As a result of the
tragic death of five innocent Americans from the anthrax letters, there was
an immediate response in Washington with the administration of antibiotics
and vaccines for exposed victims, an enormously expensive cleanup at the
Senate and Post Office buildings, and the development of forensics tools in
contractor labs. Lastly, time and resources were expended for the nearly
seven-year FBI investigation with the “person of interest” lawsuit.113 This long
ordeal ended with the death of Dr. Ivins. As I have stated on the back cover
of the book, “American Anthrax is a gripping story of a series of human
tragedies at the collision of behavior, biology, and bureaucracy. It

112. The above information comes from my personal recollections.
113. See, e.g., GUILLEMIN, supra note 39; LEONARD A. COLE, THE ANTHRAX LETTERS: A
MEDICAL DETECTIVE STORY (Joseph Henry Press 2003); DAVID WILLMAN, THE MIRAGE MAN: BRUCE
IVINS, THE ANTHRAX ATTACKS, AND AMERICA’S RUSH TO WAR (Bantam Books 2011) (stating that
many resources were used during the seven-year FBI investigation of Bruce Ivins).
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underscores the crucial importance not only of public health readiness but
of basic science in controlling dangerous disease outbreaks, however they
emerge.”114
The failure of the government to allow a proper closure to the story
makes it even more tragic. While the circumstantial evidence against Dr.
Ivins was convincing, many technical questions about the investigation still
remain.115 The last opportunity for an open court trial of the case
evaporated when the Department of Justice settled out of court with Mrs.
Maureen Stevens, the rightfully distraught wife of Robert Stevens, the Florida
man whose illness and death resulted from inhalation of anthrax spores.116
IV. DOMESTIC RESPONSE
A.

The U.S. Biosecurity Build Up

In response to the anthrax letters, Congress quickly went beyond the
1997 Select Agent Rule. Under the USA PATRIOT Act and the Public Health
Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002,
registration was required of individual scientists with laboratory access to the
Select Agents.117 For the first time, we were licensing scientists to work with a
defined set of pathogens. However, this license was not meant to protect
public safety, dependent on competence like a driver’s license, it was about
public security and included background checks much like the one the FBI
had conducted when they cleared Dr. Ivins long before he became a
suspect in the anthrax letters investigation. One person had apparently sent
the anthrax letters, but all scientists in a class were subject to these new laws.
We may never know how much safer the laws have made us, but many

114. GUILLEMIN, supra note 39.
115. See REVIEW OF THE SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES USED DURING THE FBI’S INVESTIGATION OF
THE 2001 ANTHRAX LETTERS, COMM. ON SCI., TECH., & LAW, POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS DIV.,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNSEL OF THE NAT’L ACADS. (2011) (stating that many technical questions
remain regarding the FBI’s investigation of the 2001 anthrax letters).
116. Scott Shane, U.S. Settles Suit Over Anthrax Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, November 29, 2011,
at A19.
117. Kunal J. Rambhia et al., Everywhere You Look: Select Agent Pathogens, 9 BIOSECUIRTY
& BIOTERROISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE & SCI. 70 (2011), available at http://www.up
mc-biosecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2011/pdf/2011-03-03-select_agent_path
ogens.pdf. Other than variola virus, the etiologic agent of smallpox, the select agents were all
widely available in nature, and continue to be. See id. at 70. Note that SARS Corona virus has
been added to the list as well as some of the influenza viruses, not necessarily available in
nature. Id. at 69-70.
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believe they have had a negative impact on scientific progress, and even
biosecurity.118
The DOD borrowed a term and an approach from our nuclear weapons
labs in drafting Army Regulation 50-1,119 which was implemented in draft
form in 2004, the approved regulation signed on July 28, 2008, ironically
one day before Dr. Ivins’ suicide.120 The new regulation overlaid on
infectious disease research what had been the government’s approach to
safety and security in laboratories with nuclear weapons and chemical
warfare agents. While the nuclear and chemical programs were conducted
primarily in what might be called government security labs, biological surety
would eventually impact public health, academic, and industrial labs as
well.
“Biological Surety,” a system of regulations and practices used for years
in nuclear weapons labs and chemical defense labs, includes: (1) Biological
Safety, (2) Biological Security, (3) Agent Accountability, and (4) Personnel
Reliability.121 The principles of Biological Safety were developed at Camp
Detrick and have been embraced by infectious disease scientists for many
years. Biological Security, often affectionately called “Guns, Gates, and
Guards,” sometimes poses minor inefficiencies for the laboratory scientists,
but for the most part they do not mind those inconveniences or the closed
circuit cameras in their labs. Agent Accountability, like other good ideas in
the nuclear model, turned out to be impossible to implement in biology. The
requirements to account for the quantity of organisms in one’s lab day to
day was scaled back somewhat after essentially shutting down the lab for
several months. Finally, Personnel Reliability involves interviews, reporting,
medical history checks, and other personally invasive actions.122

118. Arturo Casadevall & David A. Relman, Microbial Threat Lists: Obstacles in the Quest
for Biosecurity?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS: MICROBIOLOGY 83, 153 (2010), available at
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20065941.
119. See DEPT. OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 50-1, BIOLOGICAL SURETY: NUCLEAR AND
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND MATERIAL (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/ar
50-1.pdf [hereinafter AR 50-1].
120. See David Willman, Senators Question FBI’s Handling of Anthrax Probe, L.A. TIMES,
September 18, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/sep/18/nation/na-anthrax18.
121. ARMY BIOSURETY PROGRAM, U.S. ARMY MEDICAL RESEARCH AND MATERIEL COMMAND, 12 (2000), available at http://mrmc.amedd.army.mil/assets/docs/media/biosuretyComm
Plan.pdf. Biological Safety is protecting the scientists and the community around a laboratory
from the microbes. Biological Security is protecting the microbes from those who might misuse
them. Agent Accountability is keeping a “real time” account of quantities of microbes.
Personal Reliability is attempting to assure that no laboratory worker or other individual with
access to the microbes is the kind of person who might use microbes to cause harm. Id.
122. See AR 50-1, supra note 121, at 5.
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But our response as a government was not over; we were primed by the
horrific events of 9/11. We will never know how we would have responded
to the anthrax letters in isolation of these events. In 1997, the entire U.S.
Government’s budget for biodefense was $137 million, and this was all
within the DOD.123 In 1998, the CDC received $148 million for diagnostics
and public health lab upgrades, education of healthcare responders, and
the stockpiling of medical countermeasures in the Strategic National
Stockpile.124 By 2002, the U.S. Government was spending $4.1 billion total
for biosecurity.125 While the DOD’s budget for medical countermeasures
research remained flat after doubling in 1998, the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), previously only collaborating at the periphery of
medical biological defense, received a significant plus-up, mostly within the
NIH’s National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease (NIAID). A few
years later, the NIAID would announce the award of grants to academic
consortia for basic research to develop countermeasures.126 The initiative
would include the construction of two BSL-4 labs and, planned at the time,
13 BSL-3 labs,127 mostly on campuses located regionally across the U.S.
The media and fellow scientists from other disciplines asked many questions
during those years. The most common was, “Do we really need all these
new high-containment labs?” It was at this time that a group of more than
700 scientists formally protested the massive spending at the expense of
more important research.128
B.

Surprises in Biology

While the media was asking questions, the science community was also
watching the greatly increased number of scientists who were working with
the agents formerly limited to USAMRIID, the CDC labs in Atlanta, and a
handful of contractor labs. We, the biological science community, began

123. DAVID R. FRANZ, THREATS AND RISKS TO U.S. AGRICULTURE: AN OVERVIEW 1 (2005),
available at http://fss.k-state.edu/featuredContent/PDF/Franz20050219.pdf.
124. This information comes from my personal recollection.
125. Crystal Franco & Tara Kirk Sell, Federal Agency Biodefense Funding, FY2010FY2011, 8 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRACTICE, & SCI. 129, 130
(2010), available at http://www.upmchealthsecurity.org/website/resources/publications/2010
/2010-06-14-biodefensefunding.html. See also Schuler, supra note 17, at 87, 90.
126. Biocontainment Laboratories, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/biosecuri
ty/resource/research.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2013). See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 4.
127. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 6, at 4 (explaining information
regarding containment labs and Biosafety Levels).
128. Sidney Altman et al., An Open Letter to Elias Zerhouni, 307 SCI., Mar. 4, 2005, at
1409-10, available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/307/5714/1396.summary?sid=f
942d78a-7e22-4748-8047-a0d14d67c18e.
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wondering aloud where all this was headed. Further, considering new risks,
we began to wonder if we should take issues upon ourselves before
someone with a poorer understanding of the complex challenges and the
possible outcomes did it for us. The Fink Committee of the National
Academies of Science considered this issue from April 2002 – January
2003.129 The resulting report, Biotechnology Research in an Age of
Terrorism: The Dual Use Dilemma, released to the public in 2004, became
a signpost in the discussion between biological science and security, and in
addition to the findings and recommendations, the Report’s “Experiments of
Concern”130 live on as stated below. This list of experiments has become the
legacy of the Fink Report and should be given special attention before they
are begun, as they are seven examples of research that might be misused:
1) Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective.
2) Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or
antiviral drugs.
3) Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent.
4) Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen.
5) Would alter the host range of a pathogen.
6) Would enable the evasion of diagnostic and detection modalities.
7) Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.131
Finally, the committee’s recommendation that the U.S. Government
form a national-level board bringing together biological scientists and
security professionals to report to HHS became a reality when the NSABB
was chartered in 2004.132 The stated mission of the NSABB, a Federal
Advisory Committee,133 was to “provide advice, guidance, and leadership
129. See FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at vii- viii (2004).
130. Id. at viii, 5. These are also sometimes referred to as the “Fink Seven Deadly Sins.”
131. Id. Experiment #7 regarding facilitating weaponization might be considered one
which should not be done, although the BWC might allow it in small quantities for
“prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.” Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons
and on their Destruction, art. 1, ¶1, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163,
available at http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc/text [hereinafter BWC]. The point is that
the Committee did not intend to automatically ban all seven of the experiments listed, but to
ask the community of scientists to consider them carefully before undertaking such research.
See FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at 36.
132. FINK REPORT, supra note 20, at 9. See also DANA A. SHEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
supra note 26, at 4.
133. See WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SVC., FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: AN
OVERVIEW 1 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40520.pdf. Often called a
“FACA,” it is a type of committee assembled by a government agency to allow non-
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regarding biosecurity oversight of dual use research, defined as biological
research with legitimate scientific purpose that may be misused to pose a
biologic threat to public health and/or national security.”134
C. The NSABB and DUR
The NSABB held public meetings from its inception. Several internal
subgroups were formed initially to focus on particular topics such as, criteria
for identifying DUR, codes of conduct for life sciences researchers,
responsible communication of dual use life sciences research, biosecurity
issues raised by synthetic genomics and international collaboration for
oversight of DUR.135 Some of these were dissolved and new ones
established as needs changed or new questions arose over the years. The
NSABB met as needed in plenary and the subcommittees met more often.
Typically, the subcommittees drafted recommendations and then the full
board edited and formally approved each before sending them from the
NIH to HHS. From HHS, the approved recommendations were sent to the
White House, where the real customer was the National Security Staff.
The International Engagement Subcommittee, which I co-chaired from
the beginning, held a series of international meetings in Washington, D.C.
The largest meeting, in November 2008, involved representatives from 37
countries.136 At each meeting, we introduced the NSABB and explained the
challenges concerning DURC as we understood them, then sought to gain
perspective regarding perceptions of the DURC issues, common challenges,
and potential solutions from our partners.137 The reports of the early
meetings are available on the NSABB’s website.138 In recent years, after the
face-to-face international meetings became too large and too expensive, we
held a series of webinars with local experts from major global regions.

governmental Subject Matter Experts to advise the government without conflict. The law
establishing the process is called The Federal Advisory Committee Act.
134. About NSABB, OFFICE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES, http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecu
rity/about_nsabb.html (last visited Aug. 18, 2013).
135. Italicized words illustrate the topics of the NSABB’s Working Groups and ultimate
early reports. Meeting Agenda from NSABB Meeting July 13, 2006, NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD.
FOR BIOSECURITY (July 13, 2006), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/meetings/200
607/Criteria%20Working%20Group.pdf.
136. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, SUSTAINING PROGRESS IN THE LIFE
SCIENCES: STRATEGIES FOR MANAGING DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 1 (2008), available at
http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/PDF/Report%20from%203rd%20Rt_Final_18%20May%202
009.pdf.
137. See id. at 2.
138. See Office of Biotechnology Activities, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://oba.od.nih.gov/
biosecurity/biosecurity_documents.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
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Recordings of these broadcasts are also available on the NSABB’s
website.139
The most relevant and comprehensive document produced by the
NSABB was the June 2007 report entitled, Proposed Framework for the
Oversight of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the
Potential Misuse of Research Information.140 This end-to-end roadmap
overlaid the concept and awareness of DURC on the life sciences’
fundamental research. Further, this report gave the U.S. Government and
NIH the first and best globally available guidebook for dealing with the
complexities pertaining to discovery and responsibility in the life sciences
and technical security related surprises.
D. Back to the Letters
In August 2002, not long after Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, a scientist at
the State University of New York at Purchase, and closely affiliated with the
Federation of American Scientists, published and discussed with the media
her numerous and varied hypotheses mostly proposing U.S. Government
employees as the perpetrators,141 Attorney General John Ashcroft stated in a
press conference that Dr. Steven Hatfill was a “person of interest” in the
anthrax letters case.142 While Dr. Hatfill vehemently denied involvement, the
FBI continued to pursue him. At one point in 2003, the FBI even drove over
Dr. Hatfill’s foot143 and agents also showed up at his significant other’s
home and “trashed” it, apparently searching for evidence.144 In 2003, Dr.
Hatfill filed a lawsuit against Ashcroft, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
several media outlets.145 The negotiations went on for more than five years,

139. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://videocast.nih.gov
/summary.asp?Live=10326 (last visited Oct. 11, 2013).
140. See NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE
OVERSIGHT OF DUAL USE LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL
MISUSE OF RESEARCH INFORMATION (2007).
141. Projects and Initiatives, FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.fas.org
/projects.htm. See also Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, Op-Ed., Anthrax Attacks Pushed Open an
Ominous Door, L. A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2002), http://articles.latimes.com/2002/sep/22/opin
ion/op-rosenberg22.
142. Complaint at 19-20, Hatfill v. Ashcroft, 404 F.Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. 2005) (No.
Civ.A. 03-1793(RBW)).
143. Kelli Arena, Hatfill Ticketed in Altercation with FBI Agent, CNN.COM (May 19, 2003,
4:40 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/05/19/hatfill/.
144. Robert D. Novak, Novak: Hatfill Affair Tells of FBI’s Esteem Dip, HOUSTON CHRONICLE
(Aug. 31, 2002), http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/Novak-Hatfill-affair-tells-ofFBI-s-esteem-dip-2103560.php.
145. See Complaint, supra note 144. See also Hatfill v. New York Times Company, 416
F.3d 320 (4th Cir. 2005).
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but in June 2008, the U.S. Government exonerated Dr. Hatfill and
announced a settlement of $4.6 million.146
In July 2005, Dr. Hatfill filed a lawsuit against the New York Times and
Nicholas D Kristof, a New York Times reporter, for statements Kristof
published suggesting that Hatfill was the “likely culprit.”147 This case was
dismissed on summary judgment on January 12, 2007, based on the fact
that Dr. Hatfill was a public figure and had not proven malice on the part of
the New York Times.148 Dr. Hatfill also filed a lawsuit against Donald
Foster,149 a forensic linguist who had stated in a 2003 Reader’s Digest
article that Hatfill’s travels and the postmarks on certain anthrax hoax letters
closely correlated.150 That suit was apparently settled out of court. Soon after
the 2003 lawsuit that Hatfill filed against the DOJ, the FBI began to focus its
attention on Dr. Ivins, an anthrax vaccine specialist at USAMRIID.151 As the
questioning and surveillance of Dr. Ivins’ family and himself continued, the
pressure on the FBI to solve the nearly seven-year-old case intensified.
During this time, we learned much more about the life of the hard-working
and selfless, but quirky scientist so many of us knew. On the morning of
August 2, 2008, the Frederick News Post opened with the headline:
“Anthrax Case Turns.”152 Dr. Ivins had committed suicide.
V. THEY ARE RELATED
A.

DURC and the Insider Threat

The anthrax letters were not an example of DURC. However, they are
believed by many to have been the result of a lone insider’s action ––
whether that insider was from USAMRIID or another legitimate government
or non-government laboratory. The best approaches to preventing either the
146. Shane Scott & Eric Lichtblau, Scientist is Paid Millions by U.S. in Anthrax Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, June 28, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/28/washington/28hatfill.html?_r=
1&.
147. Hatfill, 416 F.3d at 325.
148. Michael Sung, Federal Judge Dismisses Anthrax Defamation Suit against New York
Times, JURIST (January 13, 2007, 9:13 AM), http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2007/01/
federal-judge-dismisses-anthrax.php.
149. See Brief for Petitioner, Hatfill v. Foster, No. 1:04-cv-01001 (E.D. Va. Aug 23,
2004).
150. John Gerstein, Hatfill Settles $10M Libel Lawsuit, N.Y. SUN, Feb. 27, 2007,
http://www.nysun.com/national/hatfill-settles-10m-libel-lawsuit/49333/.
151. Scott Shane & Eric Lichtblau, Scientist’s Suicide Linked to Anthrax Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/02/washington/02anthrax.html?ref=bruce
eivins&_r=0.
152. Gina Galluci-White & Justin Palk, Anthrax Case Turns, FREDERICK NEWS-POST, Aug. 2,
2008, http://www.fredericknewspost.com/archive/article_00d56ca2-f6f1-58b9-a5b6-d7a93
8ee9b77.html?mode=story.
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DURC release or insider attack are likely very similar. Tighter regulation of
an entire class of individuals, whatever their knowledge, experience, or
access to technical tools, is unlikely to prevent another similar act by an
unethical, uncaring, unstable, or criminal mind. Yet, new regulation has
been the dominant response by the U.S. Government.
Within ten days after Dr. Ivins’ death, U.S. House of Representatives
John Dingell and Bart Stupak wrote to President George W. Bush:
If these allegations are true, the FBI has identified serious weaknesses in the
security at one of our Nation’s premier laboratories for the study of some of
the most deadly pathogens in the world. Their allegations also raise equally
troubling security concerns about the thousands of other scientists and
technicians who work at hundreds of labs across our country with ‘select
biological agents’ such as anthrax.153

1. Washington Studies the Problem
During 2009, four national-level studies would be undertaken to
consider the insider threat with each of the studies funded by the U.S.
Government.154 Three of the committees were made up of senior nongovernment advisors, and the fourth, of civilian and uniformed government
employees.
The Defense Science Board’s study, Department of Defense Biological
Safety and Security Program, published in May 2009, acknowledged the
difficulty of preventing the insider threat.155 It suggested, first, to use a red
teaming approach to understand the vulnerabilities and assure security of
laboratory computer systems.156 Second, to monitor activities without undue
impact on the research process and to conduct “periodic meetings with
laboratory personnel to reinforce values, moral obligations, and
observations that should be reported.”157 Third, to tailor any Personnel
Reliability Program (PRP) for biological research, rather than simply overlay
the nuclear model.158 Fourth, to use DOD background investigations for
host country personnel working in high-containment U.S. Government labs
outside the U.S.159 Fifth, to combine the many current compliance
inspections with a single, independent inspection team made up of
153. Letter from John Dingell, Chairman, Comm. on Energy and Commerce, to George
Bush, President of the United States (Aug. 8, 2008), available at http://www.nobio.org/html/
dingell_press_release.html.
154. See text accompanying notes 157, 166, 173, and 176.
155. See DEF. SCI. BD., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE BIOLOGICAL SAFETY AND SECURITY PROGRAM
19-20 (2009), available at http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA499977.pdf.
156. Id. at 41.
157. Id. (from memorandum of Chairman).
158. Id.
159. Id.
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experienced individuals.160 Sixth, to review the usefulness of the current
“two-person rule” for insider threats,161 and to use the “lost in the crowd
rule” for shipping Biological Select Agent and Toxins between labs.162 Lastly,
to keep the public involved and informed by communicating regularly,
particularly regarding mission, safety measures, and emergency response
plans.163
Also, in May 2009, the NSABB released a study, Enhancing the
Personnel Reliability of Persons with Select Agent Access.164 The Board
addressed PRPs, which are programs traditionally focused on insider threat.
The report made five key recommendations. First, to enhance extant PRP,
but stated that a national PRP is unnecessary at this time.165 Second, to
strengthen the current FBI Security Risk Assessment (SRA),166 but to do so
efficiently so as not to impede the recruitment of researchers.167 Third, to
enhance the culture of responsibility and accountability, which it noted as
the best defense against the insider threat.168 Fourth, to encourage
professional societies to get involved, continue the dialogue, and “foster
community-based solutions.”169 Fifth, to reduce or stratify the list of Select
Agents and Toxins, thereby focusing on the most important agents.170
In July 2009, HHS released Report of the Trans-Federal Task Force on
Optimizing Biosafety and Biocontainment Oversight.171 The task force
recommended improved coordination of oversight activities, “encourage[d]
160. DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 157, at 45.
161. Id. See JAMES LEDUC ET AL., POTENTIAL IMPACT OF A 2-PERSON SECURITY RULE ON
BIOSAFETY LEVEL 4 LABORATORY WORKERS 15(7) (July 2009), available at http://wwwnc.cdc.
gov/eid/article/15/7/08-1523_article.htm (“two-person rule” requires that no single
individual work in a laboratory alone).
162. DEF. SCI. BD., supra note 157, at 40. (“lost in the crowd” is the concept of using plain
or routine packaging for mailing valuable, or in this case potentially amusable, materials, so
that the package will not be identifiable as usual or different).
163. Id.
164. NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, ENHANCING PERSONNEL RELIABILITY AMONG
INDIVIDUALS WITH ACCESS TO SELECT AGENTS 1 (May 2009), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/
biosecurity/meetings/200905T/NSABB%20Final%20Report%20on%20PR%205-29-09.pdf.
165. Id. at 6.
166. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, BIOTERRORISM SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT FORM (FD961), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/bioterrorism-security-risk-assessment-form
/bioterrorism-security-risk-assessment-form-fd-961.
167. Id. at 12.
168. Id. at 13.
169. Id. at 15.
170. Id. at 16.
171. ASS’T SEC’Y OF PREPAREDNESS & REPSONSE, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
REPORT OF THE TRANS-FEDERAL TASK FORCE ON OPTIMIZING BIOSAFETY AND BIOCONTAINMENT
OVERSIGHT (July 2009) available at https://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/boards/biosafe
tytaskforce/Documents/transfedbiocontainmentrpt092009.pdf.
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a robust culture of accountability characterized by individual and
institutional compliance” with policies, development of a national strategy
for training and technical competence in containment lab research,
obtaining and analyzing data from laboratory accidents and incidents, and
assuring that biosafety and biocontainment regulations were current.172 The
taskforce also recommended the development of an “agricultural equivalent
of the [Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories] BMBL,”
development of a “national research agenda for applied biosafety and
biocontainment,” and, finally, “improve[d] sharing of strategies to ensure
effective public communication and outreach.”173
Finally, in September 2009, the U.S. National Academies of Science
released the report, Responsible Research with Biological Select Agents and
Toxins.174 Like the other three reports above, it made recommendations for
improving the security within our laboratories.175 First, laboratory leadership
and the Select Agent Program should foster a “culture of trust and
responsibility.”176 Second, a biological select agents and toxins advisory
committee should be formed to provide continual oversight of the list of
related regulations.177 Third, the Select Agents list should be stratified and
provisions developed for timely inclusion or removal of an agent from the
list.178 Fourth, accountability for agent materials should focus on archived
stocks, but not working materials, and counting of vials should not be
employed for agents that replicate.179 Fifth, the FBI’s Security Risk
Assessment requirement should be maintained, but with an appeals
process.180 Sixth, regulatory obligations should be clarified by defining
“minimum cross-agency physical security requirements.”181 Seventh, an
“independent evaluation of the Select Agent Program should be
undertaken” and, lastly, inspectors should be mandated to have scientific
and laboratory knowledge and experience, and training and inspections
should be harmonized.182

172. Id. at 87, 94, 103.
173. Id. at 109, 122, 125.
174. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH WITH
BIOLOGICAL SELECT AGENTS AND TOXINS (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
books/NBK44956/pdf/TOC.pdf.
175. Id. at 89.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 107.
178. Id. at 112.
179. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD., supra note 176, at 115.
180. Id. at 83.
181. Id. at 123.
182. Id. at 127, 130.
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2. Much Has Been Accomplished
In addition to clarifying the challenges and formulating alternative
strategies, the NSABB quickly engaged the science and policy communities
both domestically and internationally. Academic centers and traditional nongovernmental organizations began training. International outreach
programs were begun and the U.S. Departments of State, Defense and
Energy, and the FBI funded efforts to do the same. The focus of most of the
outreach programs was on training of laboratory risk assessment and risk
reduction, DURC, biosafety, and biosecurity. In recent years, as some of our
international colleagues have pushed back against suggestions for DURC
training and biological security training, the U.S. training teams have
emphasized the better accepted term, “responsible life sciences research.”
Where ambassadors of DURC have engaged their international colleagues
as equals and worked jointly to address the issues, positive relationships of
understanding and trust have often resulted.
3. An Incomplete Response
Although much has been accomplished, domestically there has been
little emphasis on the role of healthy cultures within laboratories to counter
the potential for accidental misapplications or intentional misuses of
biological technologies by those possessing relevant knowledge. The broad
positive, prophylactic impact that enlightened leadership can play is
apparently either not fully appreciated or assumed away, which has led to a
continued lack of emphasis on the role of leadership.
Note that each of the 2009 reports made some mention of the
importance of leadership, cultures of responsibility, accountability and trust,
and values and moral obligations.183 Yet to date, government laws,
regulations, and even guidelines show little attention or investment in
improving or even encouraging the kind of leadership that fosters such
values.184 Regulatory solutions, increased oversight, and assignment of
responsibility without commensurate authority remain the norm. Regulations
that lend themselves to check-box management by contractors have
proliferated. Enlightened leadership fostering cultural change is difficult to
scale and its impact difficult to measure. Busy regulators typically move on
to other things after a single vote. The approaches recently taken by the
government are much more likely to result in disgruntled, rather than happy

183. See NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 166, at v; ASS’T SEC’Y OF
PREPAREDNESS & REPSONSE, supra note 173, at 10-11; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L
ACAD., supra note 176, at 89.
184. David R. Franz & James W. LeDuc, Balancing our Approach to the Insider Threat, 9
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 205, 206 (2011).
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employees. These solutions are also less likely to contribute to a culture of
trust and openness. There is no convincing evidence that these approaches
make our citizens safer.
In an example of another extremely complex challenge, protecting New
York City from terrorists, a data set appears to be developing that suggests
behavioral approaches and community policing with much less disruption to
the lives of law-abiding citizens is working. The system has interrupted a
number of terrorist plots in recent years.185 By building human relationships
of trust, or at least respect, law enforcement can improve both its situational
awareness as well as interdict would-be malevolent actors before they can
bring harm to the community.
VI. TECHNICAL SURPRISE OR ETHICAL LAPSE?
A.

H5N1

In September 2011, Dr. Ron Fouchier, Ph.D., of the Erasmus University
Medical Center in Rotterdam, Netherlands, described his NIH-funded work
with the H5N1 influenza virus.186 The NIH funded similar research in the
laboratory of Dr. Yoshihiro Kawaoka, Ph.D., at the University of WisconsinMadison. Both grants were financed to develop mutant strains of the H5N1
influenza virus that would be transmissible to mammals.187 During a meeting
of the European Scientific Working Group on Influenza in Malta,188 Dr.
Fouchier described his successful development as “very bad news”189 and
the viral product as “efficiently transmitted as seasonal [flu] virus.”190 In the
November 2011, publication of Science, Dr. Fouchier described what he
had developed as “probably one of the most dangerous viruses you can
make.”191 Shortly thereafter, Dr. Fouchier and Dr. Kawaoka submitted

185. Judith Miller, Op-Ed., How to Stop Terrorists before They Kill, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25,
2013, at A15.
186. INFLUENZA TIMES, (European Scientific Working Group on Influenza (ESWI), Malta),
Sep. 11-14, 2011, http://labs.fhcrc.org/cbf/Papers/H5N1_docs/FEIC_news_from_Malta.pdf.
187. Bryan Walsh, H5N1 Paper Published: Deadly, Transmissible Bird Flu Could Be Closer
than Thought, TIME HEALTHLAND BLOG (May 3, 2012), http://healthland.time.com/2012/05/
03/h5n1-paper-published-deadly-transmissible-bird-flu-could-be-closer-than-thought/.
188. INFLUENZA TIMES, supra note 188.
189. Katherine Harmon, What Really Happened in Malta This September When
Contagious Bird Flu Was First Announced, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Dec. 30, 2011), http://blogs.Scien
tificamerican.com/observations/2011/12/30/what-really-happened-in-malta-this-septemberwhen-contagious-bird-flu-was-first-announced/.
190. INFLUENZA TIMES, supra note 188.
191. Martin Enserink, Controversial Studies Give a Deadly Flu Virus Wings, 334 SCI. 1192,
1192 (2011).
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manuscripts describing their findings to Science and Nature.192 Concerned
that the papers contained DURC relevant information, the editors asked the
NSABB to review them.193 The NSABB met in plenary while sub-group
sessions spent tens of hours discussing the papers.194 In addition, influenza
experts from government laboratories were consulted and safety and security
implications concerning the draft manuscripts were considered.195
Finally, in late December of 2011, the NSABB made recommendations
that a small amount of key information regarding the sequences that were
used and/or discovered should be redacted from the publications, that the
redacted information be made available to the global science community
on a need-to-know basis, and that the manuscripts and implications of
publication be discussed with key experts in the international science
community.196 In addition, the NSABB proposed a three-month moratorium
on further publication and/or presentation of work with these viruses.197
In February 2012, in response to the NSABB, the U.S. Government
helped organize a meeting with the World Health Organization (WHO) at its
headquarters in Geneva.198 Attendance included NSABB chair, U.S.
Government science leaders, the authors of the two papers in question, and
representatives from other countries (Indonesia, China, The Netherlands,
France, Australia, Vietnam, U.K., Hong Kong, and South Africa).199 At this
meeting, new data was presented and Dr. Fouchier described the results
with more modest interpretation than he had in the prior months.200 The
meeting ended with the following consensus: the findings contribute to our
ability to conduct surveillance and to understand pathogenesis, and they
highlight safety and security concerns.201 Further, the group concluded that

192. Lauren Neergaard, U.S.: Don’t Publish Lab-Bred Bird Flu Recipe, NBCNEWS.COM
(Dec. 20, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/45738690/ns/health-cold_and_flu/t/
us-don’t-publish-lab-bred-bird-flu-recipe/#.UlglEs0ZLUk.
193. See id.
194. See id.
195. Press Release, Nat’l Inst. of Health, Press Statement on the NSABB Review of H1N1
Research (Dec. 20, 2011), http://www.nih.gov/news/health/dec2011/od-20.htm.
196. Id.
197. Martin Enserink, U.S. Biosecurity Panel May Call for Asilomar-Style Moratorium on
H5N1 Papers, SCI. INSIDER, (Dec. 23, 2011, 1:10 PM), http://news.sciencemag.org/2011/
12/u.s.-biosecurity-panel-may-call-asilomar-style-moratorium-h5n1-papers.
198. News Release, World Health Org., Public Health, Influenza Experts Agree
H5N1Research Critical, But Extend Delay (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/
news/releases/2012/h5n1_research_20120217/en/.
199. List of Participants, Technical Consultation on H5N1 Research Issues, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Feb. 16-17, 2012), http://www.who.int/influenza/human_animal_interface/list_partici
pants/en/index.html.
200. See News Release, World Health Org., supra note 200.
201. See id.
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redaction and limited distribution is not feasible, the mutant viruses should
be kept in the labs, the moratorium should continue in effect, and work of
this type should be supported in the future.202
In March 2012, the two authors and their journal editors then met with
the NSABB and the Directors of the NIH and the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Disease (NIAID).203 The NSABB was allowed to read the latest
versions of Dr. Fouchier’s and Dr. Kawaoka’s manuscripts and hear oral
presentations from the authors as well.204 After a period of discussion, the
NSABB voted unanimously in support of the publication of Kawaoka’s paper
and with simple majority to publish Fouchier’s.205 Although both authors’
works were eventually published, the long-term solutions to this complex
DURC issue are far from clear.206
B.

Thoughts on the H5N1 Episode

Earlier, I described DURC as a technical surprise. Actually, the Fink
Report’s experiments concerning the seven deadly sins could be undertaken
intentionally or discovered by surprise. Historically, what we call DURC
today probably occurred more by surprise than by plan. In this age of
biotechnology, it is likely that DURC experiments may result more from plan
than surprise; although our knowledge in this field is still relatively primitive,
we know a lot more now than we did in the 1960s. The H5N1 studies were
intentionally conducted with the goal to accomplish what was in fact done,
and were funded by HHS, the same U.S. Government department that
produced the 2007, NSABB Report, Proposed Framework for the Oversight
of Dual Use Life Sciences Research: Strategies for Minimizing the Potential
Misuse of Research Information.207 The U.S. Government received and
funded the research that it requested.
Dr. Fouchier’s and Dr. Kawaoka’s flu manuscripts were a tactical
challenge, and I believe we learned a lot in the process of dealing with

202. Id.
203. Statement of the NSABB, Nat’l Sci. Advisory Bd. for Biosecurity, Meeting of the
National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to Review Revised Manuscripts on
Transmissibility of A/H5N1 Influenza Virus (Mar. 29-30, 2012), http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/
biosecurity/PDF/NSABB_Statement_March_2012_Meeting.pdf.
204. See Ron Fouchier et al., The Fight Over Flu, 481 NATURE 257, 257 (2012). See also
Martin Enserink & David Malakoff, Will Flu Papers Lead to New Research Oversight? 335 SCI.
20, 20 (2012).
205. See Press Release, Nat’l Insts. of Health, supra note 197.
206. Brendan Maher, Bird-Flu Research: The Biosecurity Oversight, 485 NATURE 431, 434
(2012).
207. See NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, supra note 142.
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them. But our future safety and security depends on us.208 My notes, jotted
down during the early deliberations, show that I believed the ferret was a
good model of the human for transmission studies; it was not clear what the
ferret model in these experiments told us about virulence or pathogenicity in
humans following aerosol exposure; my concern was more about safety
than security; we were playing Russian roulette, potentially releasing a
mammal transmissible H5 subtype virus into the global petri dish where
pigs, chickens, ducks, and humans live together; it was important to share
these findings with the international science community, and the U.S.
Government could never censor global science communication. Jim LeDuc,
Ph.D., Director of the National Biocontainment Laboratory at the University
of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, and I described our concerns about
safety in a subsequent commentary.209
If the two manuscripts were a tactical challenge, we all share the
strategic challenge as well. The U.S. Government responded to this incident
with new draft guidelines in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of
government departments and agencies knowingly funding research with a
significant DURC outcome as we did this time, or at least doing it more
thoughtfully next time.210 After a period of public debate, the guidelines
were approved and published by NIH in August of 2013.211 There remains
little doubt that we will see future surprises in biological research, some of
which might pose significant safety risks to humans, animals, or the
environment, and some that might even be exploited by those who would do
harm. Future DURC surprises will be ever more likely to come from outside
the U.S. because of the global proliferation of capabilities and knowledge.
Therefore, it is critical we work closely with our international colleagues to
help them learn from our mistakes. In addition, it is important to learn from
their experience and to increase the likelihood that we quickly learn of any
surprises when they occur around the globe.

208. See David A. Relman, Editorial Commentary, “Inconvenient Truths” in the Public
Pursuit of Scientific Knowledge and Public Health, J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES (published online
Oct. 7, 2013).
209. James W. LeDuc & David R. Franz, Genetically Engineered Transmissible Influenza
A/H5N1: A Call for Laboratory Safety and Security, 10 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM:
BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 153, 154 (2012).
210. OFFICE OF BIOTECHNOLOGY ACTIVITIES, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, A PATH FORWARD:
FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FUNDING
DECISIONS ABOUT HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA H5N1 GAIN-OF FUNCTION RESEARCH
(2012), available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/oba/biosecurity/meetings/Dec2012/Proposed_
Framework_for_Guiding_HHS_Funding_Decisions_about_HPAI_H5N1_GOF-12-11-12.pdf.
211. NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, NIH POLICY ON MITIGATING RISKS OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE
RESEARCH OF CONCERN (2012), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-files/NOT-OD-13107.html.
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VII. REGULATORY AND BEHAVIORAL RESPONSES
A.

No Technical Solution

Noble laureate, Joshua Lederberg, Ph.D., long-time thought leader and
advisor to the government on matters of biological defense, said to Richard
Preston in a 1998 New Yorker interview, “There is no technical solution to
the problem of biological weapons. It needs an ethical, human, and moral
solution if it’s going to happen at all. Don’t ask me what the odds are for an
ethical solution, but there is no other solution.”212 Then Dr. Lederberg
paused and said, “But would an ethical solution appeal to a sociopath?”213
Dr. Lederberg was talking about biological weapons at the time, but the
concept applies as well to DURC and the insider threat. I consider
regulatory fixes, such as those we have seen, and check-box management
to be technical solutions. No one questions the importance of management
and regulations or dependence on regulatory schemes, which help make us
safer. However, overlooking or back-shelving the behavioral ones is done at
our peril. We have put in place numerous legal and regulatory systems,
both internationally and domestically, over the years. Some target biological
warfare by nation states, some target terrorism, some the insider threat, and
more recently, DURC. Some academic centers and non-governmental
organizations have underscored ethics in the course of biosafety-biosecurity
training, but the value of leadership in the context of organizational culture
has been terribly underappreciated by our government.
VIII. INTERNATIONAL
The following is a list of relevant international laws, agreements, norms,
and regulations related to biological security. Included is a brief description
of the intention of the drafters and the content of the regulatory tool relevant
to this discussion. With the exception of the Biological Weapons Convention
(BWC) of 1972, most were put in place in the last 30 years, roughly the
period addressed by this article.
A.

The BWC of 1972

The BWC was signed in 1972, and ratified in 1975.214 Currently, it is
signed by 170 states and serves as a supplement to the 1925 Geneva
Convention, which prohibited the use of biological and chemical

212. Richard Preston, Annals of Warfare: Bioweaponeers, NEW YORKER 65 (Mar. 9, 1998).
213. Id.
214. See BWC, supra note 135.
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weapons.215 The BWC prohibits the development, production, and
stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons.216 Article I of the BWC allows
research with weapons agents, but prohibits production and stockpiling
agents “of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic,
protective, or other peaceful purposes.”217 Article III prohibits assisting
another nation in the acquisition of biological weapons, and Article X
exhorts the signatories to encourage the “peaceful uses of biological science
and technology.”218
B.

United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 687 on Iraq

Adopted in April 1991, this resolution was the basis and legal authority
for the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) to govern inspections
of biological, chemical, nuclear, and missiles/weapons sites in the
country.219 It authorized the removal and destruction of all chemical and
biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150
kilometers.220 The resolution represented the terms Iraq was required to
comply with after the First Gulf War.221
C. The Trilateral Agreement
This agreement, signed in 1992, by the U.S., U.K., and Russia, was an
attempt by the U.S. and U.K. to gain information regarding the Union of
Soviet Socialists Republics (USSR) massive biological weapons program and
to assure that subsequent biological weapons activities did not continue.222
Implementation of this agreement is considered to have been a failure,
primarily because Russia was unwilling to acknowledge their former
biological weapons activities. The process demonstrated the extreme

215. Id.; Membership of the Biological Weapons Convention, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT
GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/%28httpPages%29/7BE6CBBEA0477B5
2C12571860035FD5C?OpenDocument (last visited Aug. 15, 2013).
216. BWC, supra note 135.
217. Id.
218. Id., Background Information on the Biological Weapons Convention and Oversight of
the Life Sciences, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE AT GENEVA, http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8
954/(httpAssets)/C838E9BF09C31A3DC1257505003249B4/$file/BWC+backgrounder++BWC+&+science+oversight.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2013).
219. See Chronology of Main Events, UNITED NATIONS (last updated Dec. 1999),
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/Chronology/chronologyframe.htm.
220. S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 1, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess, at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3,
1991).
221. Laura Edgerton, Note, Eco-Terrorist Acts During the Persian Gulf War: Is International
Law Sufficient to Hold Iraq Liable?, 22 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 151, 155-56 (1992).
222. David C. Kelley, The Trilateral Agreement: Lessons for Biological Weapons
Verification, 2002 VERIFICATION Y.B. (Verification Research, Training & Info. Ctr.), 93, 96-97.
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difficulty in using traditional arms control procedures and methods in
biological facilities, many of which can be used for either legitimate or
malevolent purposes.
D. UNSCR 1540
Published in April 2004, this resolution obligates states to “develop and
enforce appropriate legal and regulatory measures against the proliferation
of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and their means
of delivery” with particular attention given to avoiding proliferation of
weapons capabilities to non-state actors.223 It also requires states to
establish criminal penalties for involvement in weapons by certain non-state
actors.224 Of special interest therefore, and in contrast to the BWC, UNSCR
1540 places emphasis on reducing the likelihood that non-state actors will
acquire weapons of mass destruction.225
E.

International Health Regulations (IHR) of 2005

Entered into force in 2007, as a legal instrument binding on more than
190 countries, the IHR requires countries to report certain disease outbreaks
and public health events to the WHO.226 In addition, countries are required
to strengthen their existing capacities for disease surveillance.227 While the
IHRs are not directed at biological warfare or terrorism, it is believed that
this global early warning system will make all nations more secure by
increasing the likelihood that outbreaks or biological attacks will be
discovered as quickly as possible so intervention can begin, thus saving
lives.
IX. U.S. DOMESTIC
The following is a list of relevant U.S. domestic laws, agreements,
norms, and regulations related to biological security. Included is a brief

223. U.N. News Centre, Ban Reiterates Necessity of Political Solution to Syrian Conflict in
Meetings with Oartners, Envoy (Apr. 22, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.Asp?
NewsID=44725#.Uh5CCz7Xh4E. See also United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee,
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2013).
224. S.C. Res. 1540, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). See also Peter Crail,
Implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540: A Risk-Based Approach, 13
NONPROLIFERATION REV. 355, 365 (2006) (explaining the impact and enforcement of the
1540 resolution).
225. S.C. Res. 1540, supra note 225, ¶ 1. See also Crail, supra note 225, at 368.
226. International Health Regulations (IHR): Ten Things You Need to do to Implement the
IHR, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://www.who.int/ihr/about/10things/en/ (last visited September
18, 2013).
227. Id.
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description of the intention of the drafters and the content of the regulatory
tool relevant to this discussion.
A.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

Effective June 1996, Title V, Subtitle B, Section 511 addresses biological
weapons.228 It makes it a federal crime to threaten, conspire, or use a
biological weapon, it expands on definitions of the categories of agents,
modifies, and adds definitions regarding biological weapons, and directs
the Secretary of HHS to develop and implement what became the Select
Agent Rule of 1997.229
B.

Select Agent Rule of 1997

This first iteration of the rule in 1997, made it illegal to transfer certain
listed bacteria, viruses, or toxins between laboratories without the CDC’s
approval.230 The agents could be held and used within the lab without
permit.231
C. Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act
of 2002
Title II, Enhancing Controls on Dangerous Biological Agents and Toxins,
gave the CDC regulatory control, regulation of transfer and possession over
the Biological Select Agents and Toxins (BSAT).232 It called for registration of
persons who work with BSAT, laboratory inspections, mandated disclosure
of information, civil penalties, and certain reporting requirements, including
the requirement for notification in the case of an incident involving BSAT.233
It codified the Select Agent Program of 2001.234

228. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214. (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 262 § 511(2006)).
229. Id. See also Select Agents and Toxins, WASH. STATE UNIV., (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://www.bio-safety.wsu.edu/biosafety/toxins.asp.
230. 42 C.F.R. § 72.6(a)(1) (1997). See also Additional Requirements for Facilities
Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, Centers of Disease Control and Prevention, (Nov. 23,
2005), http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/select_agent/42CFR_Additional_Requirements.pdf
[hereinafter CDC].
231. 42 C.F.R § 72.6(a)(1) (1997). See also CDC, supra note 231, at 15.
232. WASH. STATE UNIV., supra note 230. See also Ali S. Khan, Public Health Preparedness
and Response in the USA since 9/11: A National Health Security Imperative, 378 THE LANCET
953, 954 (2011) available at http://www.cdc.gov/phpr/documents/Lancet_Article_Sept
2011.pdf.
233. General FAQ’s about Select Agents and Toxins, THE FED. SELECT AGENT PROGRAM,
(Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.selectagents.gov/FAQ_General.html#sec1q2.
234. Id.; 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2013). See also Biosafety Policy, UNIV. OF ALA., (Aug. 16, 2013),
http://bama.ua.edu/~ehs/Web%20Redo/BiolSaf.htm, 3.
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D. The USA PATRIOT Act
Effective February 2002, the full title of the act is Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept
and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001.235 The act is wide-ranging, but with
regard to biology, it has established a ten-year imprisonment and fine for
anyone who cannot prove they are using a biological agent for
“prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful
purposes.”236
E.

Army Regulation 50-1

The regulation entitled Biological Surety was enacted in draft form at
USAMRIID in 2004, signed on July 28, 2008, and became effective on
October 28, 2008.237 “Th[e] regulation prescribes policies, procedures, and
responsibilities for the Army Biological Surety Program.”238 Initially, the
regulation brought together Biological Safety, Biological Security, Agent
Accountability, and Personnel Reliability in U.S. Army laboratories.239 The
regulation was later applied to certain contractors and the Army Biological
Defense Research Program.240
F.

United States Government Policy for Oversight of Life Sciences Dual
Use Research of Concern

Released in draft form on March 29, 2012, the policy proposed to
establish regular review of U.S. Government-funded or conducted research
with a list of 15 selected pathogens including, highly pathogenic avian
influenza, and/or seven categories of experiments of concern, very similar,
but not identical to those listed in the Fink Report.241 The policy outlines

235. Uniting and Strenghtening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (Patriot Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272
(2001) (codified in various sections of the United States Code).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 175(b) (2012).
237. AR 50-1, supra note 121; Gretchen L. Demmin, Biosurety, in MEDICAL ASPECTS OF
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 543, 549, available at http://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/borden/Portlet.as
px?ID=66cffe45-c1b8-4453-91e0-9275007fd157. See also JOHN P. SKVORAK, BIOSURETY
OVERVIEW FOR THE FREDERICK COUNTY CONTAINMENT LABORATORY COMMUNITY ADVISORY
COMMITTEE (2013), http://www.cityoffrederick.com/DocumentCenter/Home/View/1089 (last
visited September 18, 2013).
238. AR 50-1, supra note 121, at i, 1.
239. Id. § 9-4e at 30.
240. Id. §§ 1-5(7)b at 4, B-3(b)3 at 36.
241. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT POLICY FOR
OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 1, 2 (2012), available at
http://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/Documents/us-policy-durc-032812.pdf [hereinafter DURC
DRAFT POLICY]; COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACS. TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
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department and agency responsibilities regarding review, risk assessment,
risk mitigation, and reporting.242 This was the first formal document to bring
together the Select Agent List and the Fink Report’s “Seven Deadly Sins.”243
G. A Framework for Guiding U.S. HHS Funding Decisions about Research
Proposals with the Potential for Generating Highly Pathogenic Avian
Influenza H5N1 Viruses that are Transmissible among Mammals by
Respiratory Droplets
Released on February 21, 2013, by HHS, the framework calls for
individual agencies, as well as HHS to perform robust reviews of proposals
to determine risks and benefits for HHS-funded research anticipated to
produce Highly-Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 viruses.244 It lists seven
criteria to be used in the review and establishes a review process.245
H. U.S. Government Policy for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual
Use Research of Concern
A draft policy document was released for public comment on February
22, 2013, to establish regular review of U.S. Government-funded or
conducted research with a list of 15 selected pathogens including, highly
pathogenic avian influenza, and/or seven categories of experiments similar
to those listed in the Fink Report.246 This policy would require DURC
oversight by institutions defined as “any government agency (Federal, State,
or local), academic institution, corporation, company, partnership, society,
association, firm, sole proprietorship, or other legal entity involved in

APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM: CONFRONTING THE DUAL USE DILEMMA 4 (2003).
242. DURC DRAFT POLICY, supra note 242, at 3-4.
243. An interesting regulatory approach and outcome, since the select agent list was
developed for security reasons and the ‘seven deadly sins’ for DUR reasons.
244. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., A FRAMEWORK FOR GUIDING UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES FUNDING DECISIONS ABOUT RESEARCH PROPOSALS
WITH THE POTENTIAL FOR GENERATING HIGHLY PATHOGENIC AVIAN INFLUENZA H5N1 VIRUSES THAT
ARE TRANSMISSIBLE AMONG MAMMALS BY RESPIRATORY DROPLETS 2 (2013).
245. Id. at 5.
246. A copy of the proposed Policy is available on the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) Science Safety Security (S3) web site. United States Government Policy
for Institutional Oversight of Life Sciences Dual Use Research of Concern, 78 Fed. Reg.
12369, 12371 (Feb. 22, 2013).
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funding, conducting, or sponsoring research.”247 NIH released the policy in
final form on August 28, 2013.248
X. REGULATORY APPROACHES: VALUE AND COST
It is interesting to note, particularly on the domestic front, that the
actions of a few have historically impacted the work of many. Mr. Harris, the
anthrax letter mailer, and scientist communication of the H5N1 research
have stimulated responses from our government in its effort to protect us.
Actions to protect us have taken place in the name of public safety and
security. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, the
Select Agent Rule, Army Regulation 50-1, and the new DURC policies are
all domestic U.S. Government actions. These regulations are wide nets cast,
rather than leadership-based approaches, to deal with troubled or frustrated
personnel more broadly. Due to the nature of the dual use dilemma
(technical surprise or ethical lapse) and insider threat (individual or small
group sociopathic behavior), these wide cast, but superficial regulatory nets
are, at best, very blunt instruments. Very few studies have looked at the
productivity of the enterprise before and after 2001, but the subject deserves
our attention.249 At least anecdotally, compliance with these regulatory
approaches has forced laboratories to hire additional contractors to
manage the programs, which has diverted funds from legitimate research,
subsequently slowing progress.250 Even with these regulations in place, the
U.S. Government cannot assure increased security.
Possibly the greatest value in the international laws and resolutions is in
their role as norms, tools of education, and awareness. Further, dialogues
around international laws and resolutions have led to some increased
understanding by bringing experts from many nations together to discuss
them, as well as the visible boundary lines which they paint on the life
sciences court. In other cases, the international laws have been barriers to
communication and understanding. Regulations may do harm when they
overburden the life sciences community or build walls internationally,
instead of simply painting the boundary lines. Internationally, there have
been more focused actions for nations who crossed the line: the Trilateral
Agreements (because of Former Soviet Union behavior) and UNSCR 687 (in

247. See id. See also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
POLICY FOR INSTITUTIONAL OVERSIGHT OF LIFE SCIENCES DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN 3-4
(2013), https://www.phe.gov/s3/dualuse/documents/oversight-durc.pdf.
248. See NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, supra note 211.
249. See, e.g., Arturo Casadevall & David A. Relman, Microbial Threat Lists: Obstacles in
the Quest for Biosecurity?, 8 NATURE REVIEWS: MICROBIOLOGY 149-154 (2010).
250. This information comes from my personal communications with Col John Skvorak,
DVM, PhD, the commander of USAMRIID (early 2010).
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response to Iraqi behavior). Domestically, the individual acts listed above
have increased oversight,251 and broad regulatory management has
become the norm within the life sciences community.
XI. WHY SO LITTLE EMPHASIS ON LEADERSHIP?
A.

Leadership Models

During the past 20 years, the role of leaders, particularly in U.S.
Government laboratories where insider threats seem to be of greater
concern than DURC, have changed dramatically. In this regard, the period
before 9/11 can be clearly differentiated from the period after. In the past,
laboratory leaders grew up within their organizations, took personal
responsibility for their organizations, and molded laboratory cultures in a
way that resulted in productivity and safety. Security was viewed differently
before 9/11, but was appropriate for that day and time. Patriotism and
teamwork were underlying principles, and the mission and focus on scientific
ethics was the norm.
Leaders who knew their organizations well also knew their people well
enough to practice preventive intervention in the rare case of outlier
behavior. The troubled scientist would seek out the leader for help if trust
was there or the leader would observe and intervene in time if the leader
was enlightened and appropriately engaged. Outlier employees were
counseled and helped or weeded from the organization. A self-centered,
arrogant, or insensitive manager would miss the warning signs, and thus, be
unable to avert disaster. Such poor leaders did not last in those days.
Today, there is much less thought given to these issues. Rather, much more
time is spent trying to assure compliance with regulations. The challenge of
heavy-handed regulation is also facing academic researchers in this country
today.252
B.

Really Hard, but Rare Problems with No Perfect Solution

We are dealing with two very hard problems in a very complex, even
messy, world today. The spectrum of natural disease kills millions of people
globally each year. Our government has focused enormous energy and
treasure on hopefully rare, but potentially high-impact intentional events.

251. For example, in 2012 the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious
Diseases (USAMRIID) had an inspector in the building between 90 and 120 working days, not
including additional FDA inspectors. Personal Communication with Col Ben DeKoning, MD,
U.S. Army Commander, USAMRIID (May 2013).
252. See Tobin L. Smith et al., Reforming Regulation of Research Universities: Regulatory
and Reporting Requirements have become Excessively Burdensome. A More Balanced
Approach is Needed, NATURE REVIEWS: MICROBIOLOGY, Summer 2011, at 57.
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Much of this is related to the terror factor and the vast unknowns. Most
Americans do not notice the deaths of 50,000 humans from seasonal
influenza complications, 30,000 from auto accidents, or even the 10,000
deaths associated with gun homicides annually, unless they involve one of
our loved ones.253 Yet, the unknowns frighten us. As we face fiscal
constraints nationally, the challenge is to balance our preparations and
resolve regarding those vast unknowns.
Dr. Lederberg told us “there is no technical solution.”254 He proposed
ethical or moral solutions, but acknowledged that such personal controls
would not appeal to an individual set on doing harm.255 Just as
epidemiologists tell us that protecting a percentage of a population with a
vaccine will indirectly protect unvaccinated individuals within a
population,256 so too, establishing a corporate culture of responsibility will
help reduce the likelihood that an individual within that culture will go
astray.
Secretary of the Navy, Richard Danzig, Ph.D., has told us that “we are
driving in the dark” with regard to understanding the risk in national
security.257 We cannot know what lies ahead. We have spent time and
hundreds of millions of dollars trying to predict what is coming and for what
to prepare.258 The insider threat is a very hard case while the DURC
challenge is also difficult, but more easily dealt with. Interestingly, both
respond to a very similar set of behavioral tools. We are much more likely to
divert, dissuade, deter, or just discover individuals prone to either course in
a healthy corporate culture than in an unhealthy one. So we get two-for-one

253. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, VOL.
61, NO. 4, at 89-91 tbl.10 (May 8, 2013) (reporting the number of deaths from 113 selected
causes in 2010, including 50,097 from influenza and pneumonia, 35,332 from motor vehicle
accidents, and 11,078 from homicides by discharge of firearms).
254. Preston, supra note 213, at 65.
255. See id.
256. “Herd Immunity” is commonly explained as the phenomenon that occurs when a
large enough percentage of a population is protected against a communicable disease
(typically by a vaccine), thereby protecting the remaining unvaccinated individuals within the
population because the disease cannot be sustained within that population. Community
Immunity (“Herd Immunity”), NAT’L INST. OF ALLERGY & INFECTIOUS DISEASES (NIAID),
http://www.vaccines.gov/basics/protection (last updated July 23, 2013).
257. See RICHARD DANZIG, DRIVING IN THE DARK TEN PROPOSITIONS ABOUT PREDICTION AND
NATIONAL SECURITY (2011).
258. See generally COMM. ON METHODOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC.’S BIOLOGICAL AGENT RISK ANALYSIS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY BIOTERRORISM RISK ASSESSMENT: A CALL FOR CHANGE (2008) (reviewing the
methodology that led to the 2006 Department of Homeland Security report, Bioterrorism Risk
Assessment (BTRA), as well as providing a foundation for future updates ).
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–– DURC and the insider threat –– protection in a healthy life sciences
laboratory culture.
C. Rethinking DURC: Did the Science Community Do the Right Thing?
It’s not surprising that we have focused our energies on the
technologies, the science, and the microbiological agents rather than on the
behavior of the scientists. At the national level, our elected officials seek to
do something to make the public feel safer, so they regulate what they
cannot directly control. For DUR, it started with the beloved Fink Report, so
we must bear part of the responsibility. When we called it DUR and listed
the seven examples of research that might be misused, we forced ourselves
to look at the technologies, the knowledge, and the science. If we had
instead called for “Responsible Life Science Research,” the term now
preferred by many of our international colleagues, we would have had to
focus on human behavior. I believe more effective outcomes would have
resulted if we had focused more on individual and corporate responsibility
than on regulation to control technologies and knowledge. No matter if the
individual scientist is armed with an oligonucleotide synthesizer or the
organization with a freezer full of Select Agents, they are less likely to do
harm with them in a healthy laboratory culture than an unhealthy one.
D. Leadership and DURC or Actually “Responsible Life Sciences Research”
Leadership is related only indirectly to DUR, but it is very much related to
responsibility, which is the real problem. Leaders, by definition, demonstrate
personal responsibility and they, by definition, develop cultures of
responsibility in the organizations that they lead. Responsible organizations
contribute, again with enormous influence by their leaders, to networks of
responsibility. Responsible leaders, groups of responsible individuals, and
networks of responsible groups provide herd immunity that protects the
whole. It’s simple, but it requires smart, caring, humble, and strong leaders
throughout the organization.
John P. Kotter, in his book, The Heart of Change, makes reference to
the U.S.’s success in WWII and underscores the need for leadership
throughout the organization.259 He writes, “[The war] . . . forced a
bureaucratic military to miraculously produce a handful of great leaders,
hundreds of good leaders, and tens of thousands of people who performed
leadership acts.” 260 Where have they gone?

259. See JOHN P. KOTTER, THE HEART OF CHANGE: REAL LIFE STORIES OF HOW PEOPLE
CHANGE THEIR ORGANIZATIONS (2002).
260. Id. at 185.
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Few would argue that Lee Iacocca, former chairman of Chrysler
Corporation, did not demonstrate exceptional leadership qualities during his
very successful career. In his book, Where have all the Leaders Gone?, he
concludes that great leaders operate from the nine “C”s:
Curiosity — a leader is a reader and listener.
Creative — a leader thinks outside the box.
Communicate — a leader tells the truth, even when it is painful.
Character — a leader knows the difference between right and wrong
and [has] the guts to do the right thing.
Courage — a leader has ‘the balls’ and is committed to talk and
negotiate.
Conviction — a leader has fire in the belly passion.
Charisma — a leader has the ability to inspire and people follow a
leader because they trust him.
Competent — a leader knows what he is doing, but more importantly
surrounds himself with others who know what they are doing.
Common Sense — a leader is a human, so has the ‘ability to reason
and use common sense and does it.’261
Stephen M.R. Covey expands on the enormous potential influence of
leadership in The Speed of Trust, saying that high-trust organizations are
characterized by increased value, accelerated growth, enhanced innovation,
improved collaboration, stronger partnering, better execution, and
heightened loyalty while low-trust organizations show redundancy,
bureaucracy, politics, disengagement, turnover, churn, and fraud.262 Where
would you rather work and from which would you expect safety and security
lapses?
Leaders come in all types and there is no single style or mold. Many
have been uncharacteristically strong leaders and have inspired trust in their
people and organizations. Others have been kind leaders and they too
inspire trust. Personality type is less important than the fundamentals of
character and integrity. William F. Baker, Ph.D., and Michael O’Malley,
Ph.D., in their book, Leading with Kindness, equate kindness with a
commitment to the welfare of your company.263 Kindness, they state, is
compassion rather than being distant, integrity is to think, say and act from

261. See LEE IACOCCA, WHERE HAVE ALL THE LEADERS GONE? 6-10 (2007).
262. STEPHEN M. R. COVEY, THE SPEED OF TRUST: THE ONE THING THAT CHANGES EVERYTHING
250-58 (2006).
263. WILLIAM F. BAKER & MICHAL O’ MALLEY, LEADING WITH KINDNESS: HOW GOOD PEOPLE
CONSISTENTLY GET SUPERIOR RESULTS 20 (2008).
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the same set of values, gratitude is, therefore, considering employees as
people rather than assets, authenticity rather than fraudulence, humility is to
listen and learn from others, and, finally, humor.264
A powerful set of leadership principles comes from Robert J. Shoop’s,
Ph.D., book, entitled A University Renaissance.265 Dr. Shoop describes the
visionary leadership early in Jon Wefald’s, Ph.D., presidency at Kansas State
University and the principles on which it was based as listed below:
1) Have a Vision and Develop a Game Plan
A leader must be able to provide a clear vision of a transformed future.
Vision encompasses strategy and goal setting but is more than simply having
a plan. Vision is a passionate commitment to creatively closing the gap
between the present reality and the desired future.
2) Communicate Your Vision
A vision is useless unless it can be shared with others. A leader must possess
a wide-range of communication skills –– articulating issues, listening to what
others have to say, and understanding diverse perspectives.
3) Hire Excellent People and Delegate Authority and Responsibility
Leaders develop the networks, relationships, and culture that form a
community. In healthy communities, everyone can find meaning and
motivation. A team attitude exists and individuals are eager to cooperate for
the common good. Collaboration makes a community greater than the sum
of its parts and enables a vision to be realized.
4) Make Decisions and Take Risks
True leaders have the courage to act. They take risks and make tough
decisions. Without risk, there is no progress. Leaders must be willing to
make bold moves and embrace the seemingly impossible.
5) Admit Mistakes and Apologize When Necessary
A leader who encourages risk-taking must allow mistakes to be made. A
leader should quickly recognize mistakes, apologize, and remedy the
situation. Accountable leaders learn from their mistakes and make changes.
Being accountable means being in charge of your choices.
6) Be Trustworthy and Care About Others
Visions are based on values. For good leaders, the means are just as
important as the end. They make improvements with integrity, taking the

264. Id. at 41-71.
265. See ROBERT J. SHOOP, A UNIVERSITY RENAISSANCE: JON WEFALD’S PRESIDENCY AT KANSAS
STATE (2001) (centering around eight characteristics of excellent leadership originally identified
in Wefald’s 1999 speech: “The Characteristics of Excellent Leadership Using Various
American Presidents as Examples”).
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right actions for the right reasons. They know that trust and credibility are
central to the leadership process.
7) Never Give Up
Never give up. Work hard. Those simple statements are at the heart of
successful leadership. The best leaders love what they are doing and put
everything they have into their efforts. Leaders make commitments and have
the determination to see them through.
8) Have a Sense of Humor
Good leaders are not afraid to laugh with others and at themselves. They
maintain a healthy sense of balance and perspective and know that humor
can sometimes diffuse a tense situation.266

Humility is not the first word that comes to mind when the average
person thinks about leadership; it is probably power, authority, or even
arrogance. But humility is absolutely essential to great leadership and what
is sometimes perceived as arrogance is often simply confidence. Humility
facilitates another characteristic of a great leader –– appreciating employees
who are smarter than you. Bo Peabody, in his book, Lucky or Smart? Secrets
to an Entrepreneurial Life, tells would-be entrepreneurs to create an
environment where smart people gather and then be smart enough to stay
out of the way.267 He goes on to say that managers are A-students and
entrepreneurs are B-students.268 Likewise, it is not unusual to find that the
best leaders are very comfortable when surrounded by people who are
smarter than they.
In industry and even in academia today, the great leaders rise to the top
on merit. As the moral underpinnings of the electorate weaken, elected
officials in a democracy can become more interested in their own position
of authority than the good of their electorate or even their nation. When they
do, their inclination is to try to control when the issues are too complex for
them to resolve quickly and easily. As in the case with DURC and the insider
threat, they often choose to regulate and in doing so, upset the balance
between appropriate regulation and freedom. An over-regulated individual,
organization, or nation will not attain its full potential.
XII. CONCLUSION
A.

Our Place in the World

Exceptional leaders and thinkers drafted the intellectual and legal
foundation of the U.S. We were made a free and powerful nation by great
266. Id. at xvi-xvii.
267. BO PEABODY, LUCKY OR SMART?: SECRETS TO AN ENTREPRENEURIAL LIFE 5 (2005).
268. Id. at 15.
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leaders. Leaders in our most productive laboratories demonstrate personal
responsibility and inculcate corporate responsibility. With the global
proliferation of biological technologies and knowledge, we now face wellqualified and serious competition in the life sciences. Patrick Lencioni, in his
book, Healthy Organizations, states “because of this global competition, it
will become ever more difficult to have a competitive advantage based on
knowledge and technologies,”269 but a healthy organization can compete
on this new, more level playing field. DURC issues and insider threat are
rare, but potentially harmful outcomes of the life sciences enterprise. Both
are outlier risks that are more likely to occur in an unhealthy or poorly led
organization.
Personal and corporate responsibility provide herd immunity, which can
protect, rehabilitate, or ferret out the outliers in an organization.
Communities of trust characterize the kind of corporate responsibility
typically orchestrated by enlightened leadership. Every organization needs
regulation; we must know the boundaries of the playing field and the rules
of the game. The greater the potential for injury in the game, the thicker the
rulebook. The safety rulebook in a high-containment infectious disease
laboratory is thick and applies to everyone. The DURC and the insider threat
rulebooks are there for the outliers, but they impact all of us. When rules for
the few become too disruptive to the work of the many, communities of trust
can break down. Laboratories with exceptional leaders armed with well
thought-out and thin DURC and insider threat rulebooks will always be
safer, more secure, and far more productive than laboratories where the
many are overregulated because of the few. It takes courage to do the right
thing –– to mentor, grow leaders, and then give them the responsibility,
authority, and the freedom to succeed. Will we find leaders with the wisdom
and the moral courage to rebalance our approach to DURC and the insider
threat?

269. PATRICK LENCIONI, THE ADVANTAGE: WHY ORGANIZATIONAL HEALTH TRUMPS EVERYTHING
ELSE IN BUSINESS 8 (2005). Lencioni goes on to say, an organization must be both smart and
healthy. Smart organizations have strategy, marketing, finance and technology. Healthy
organizations have minimal politics, minimal confusion, high morale, high productivity and
low turnover. Id. at 5-6.
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